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INTRODUCTION

Ronald Dworkin has defended with energy and eloquence the
proposition that in virtually every civil case either the plaintiff or
the defendant has a right to a particular decision.' This is a very
*Assistant Dean of the Valparaiso University School of Law.
tAt various times the following people have criticized and contributed to this
article and its earlier versions: Richard Baepler, Ronald Dworkin, John Griffiths, Jack
Hiller, David A.J. Richards, Eugene Schoon, Amber Smith, and Richard Stith. The
author retains sole responsibility for all errors.
1. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xiv, 71, 279, 288, 290, 327-28,
330, 332, 334 (1977) (all citations are to the revised paperback edition); Dworkin, No
Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, at 2, 3, 5, 11, 21, 29, 32 (1978) (this is a revised ver-

sion of an essay that appeared in

LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

H.L.A. HART (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977); Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J.
PHILOSOPHY

624, 636-37 (1963)).
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special claim, and one that, as we .shall see, is ultimately untenable.
Dworkin's claim is stronger than the assertion that parties to a
dispute have a right to a particular process of adjudication, for a
process of adjudication need not inevitably entail a particular decision in every case.2 It is considerably stronger than the claim that in
many cases there will exist rights within the legal system requiring
the judge to reach a particular decision in a case, for such a claim
does not suggest that this will always be true.' His claim is, I would
argue, even stronger than the proposition that the winner of virtually all cases within a legal system may be determined by an examination of the rights of the litigants, for Dworkin seems to suggest that
not merely the outcome is determinate but also the holding and the
line of reasoning on which both outcome and holding rest."
Dworkin's tenacious defense of his stark claim is surprising.
His proposition does not follow directly from his rights thesis, as
Dworkin will at times admit and at times appear to deny.' The right
answer hypothesis stands or falls on its own, with .admittedly
distinctive corollaries, but without essential ties to the other portions of Professor Dworkin's argument. Thus, he acknowledges that
he cannot demonstrate the validity of the right answer hypothesis,
and even accepts that it cannot be said to hold for absolutely every
case.' And yet he continues to urge his claim, suggesting at times
that it is essential to the remainder of his work.!
2.

See Richards, Taking Taking Rights Seriously Seriously, 52 N.Y.U.L.

REV. 1265, 1314-15 (1977).
3. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 199-202 (1975). Sar-

torius, like Dworkin, accepts that there will be some cases for which no right answer
exists. Their claims, however, are different. Dworkin permits only ties as exceptions to
his right answer hypothesis. Text accompanying notes 113-17, 162-78, infra. Sartorius
claims that the exceptions are not ties but rather cases for which we possess no defining mechanism at all. Thus, though cases without right answers may exist, we cannot
know which ones they are. He makes this same argument at greater length in a recent
essay. Sartorius, Bayes' Theorem, Hard Cases, and JudicialDiscretion, 11 GA. L. REV.
1269 (1977). This claim may be more plausible. See text accompanying notes 182-86,
infra. Even so, his arguments are premised upon a significant flaw. Note 116, infra.
4. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 282. See Greenawalt, Discretionand Judicial
Decision The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359,
379 (1975).
5. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 282-83, 290, 330, 332; Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L.
REV., supra note 1, at 32.
6. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 285-87, 332, 334, 359; Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L.
REV., supra note 1, at 2, 30, 32.
7. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 280, 332; Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV, supra
note 1, at 2; see Perry, Book Review: Taking Rights Seriously, 88 ETHICS 80, 86 (1977)
(discussing Dworkin's recurrent interest in the right answer hypothesis).
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It is not. Indeed, the falsity of the right answer hypothesis is
itself a fundamental element of any humane legal system, as I have
sought to demonstrate elsewhere." In this article I will closely examine the two essays in which Professor Dworkin most clearly
asserts the right answer hypothesis.9 I attempt to detail the gaps in
his argument, and explain why his hypothesis must fail. I neither
mean nor wish to controvert the rights thesis, however. Indeed, I
will conclude that the failure of the right answer hypothesis actually supports the remainder of Dworkin's argument by providing a
sounder and more descriptively accurate justification for it.
BACKGROUND: WHAT IS THE RIGHT ANSWER HYPOTHESIS?

Deep Background: Where Does the Rights Thesis Come From?
Ronald Dworkin's work has generated such an extensive body
of responsive literature that it hardly seems necessary any longer to
summarize his jurisprudence. Nevertheless, I will begin with a short
statement of what I think the rights thesis is about and the stimuli
to which it responds.
The essays in which Dworkin developed the rights thesis
reflect a gradual transition from a narrow refutation of some of
H.L.A. Hart's tenets of legal positivism to a broad and independent
descriptive and normative legal theory.'0 Initially, Dworkin seemed
to be concerned that Hart's philosophy accepted too many of the
8. Farago, Intractable Cases, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV __
(1980) (forthcoming).
This article and the one in the New York University Law Review are connected in important ways and are meant to complement one another. The NYU article seeks to
demonstrate a general observation about the nature of jurisprudence. I argue there
that it is impossible to develop a theory of law which provides a single substantively
correct answer for every legitimately brought case without allowing recourse to some
arbitrary or dictatorial decision-making mechanism in at least some cases. In this article I seek to apply that observation to Dworkin's apparent claims to the contrary. I
have provided a sufficient summary of the other article here (text accompanying notes
43-59, infra) to permit the reader to understand the nature of that claim. This does not
mean, of course, that the summary will provide an adequate sense of the argument
supporting the claim, and I urge readers who remain skeptical about the arguments in
text accompanying notes 43-59, infra, of this essay to consult the other article.
9. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 279-90; Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra
note 1.
10. This development may be seen even by comparing chapters 2 and 4 of R.
DWORKIN, supra note 1. The former, originally published in 1967 (which itself is an expansion of the ideas in Dworkin, 60 J. PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, published in 1963), is
almost solely a critique of Hart's positivism. The latter, originally published in 1975, is
an endeavor at a comprehensive theory of judicial behavior.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1980], Art. 1
374

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

rule-skeptical claims of the legal realists." In particular, he could not
accept the residual discretion that Hart accorded the judiciary in
responding to lacunae in the law. 2 Hart's notion of the law's "open
texture" violated Dworkin's sense of the process of judging, perhaps
drawn from his own experience as a judicial clerk."3 For Dworkin it
seemed unacceptable that judges could ever be licensed simply to
decide as a legislature would. Rather, he felt that judges were
always constrained to seek the answers that were somehow required by their legal systems.1'
David Richards has suggested that this concern may well have
political roots. He notes that the differences between British and
American political history may account for the differences in Hart's
and Dworkin's jurisprudence." Both men have sought to express
theories of law that, at their root, protect the rights of individual
litigants by empowering an anti-majoritarian judiciary to address
questions left unanswered (or answered wrongly) by the legislature.
Richards points out, however, that in the United States, where a
Constitution explicitly provides a normative framework for rightsbased litigation, arguments favoring judicial discretion permit the
judge to ignore the principles embodied in that document. Conversely, in the United Kingdom, where no such document exists, judicial
discretion is the only mechanism whereby the judiciary may
recognize, at least initially, the existence of human rights as a basis
for their decision-making."6
Richards' recognition is quite helpful. It directs our attention to
Dworkin's role as a political as well as legal philosopher. More particularly, it reminds us that Dworkin's arguments, even at their
most complex, almost always seek to provide a theoretical basis for
relatively simple and common claims. As recent history has unfolded, Dworkin's interest has closely paralleled the unravelling of
the currently prevailing American social concerns." And his work
11. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 15-16, suggesting that positivism and realism
differ from one another "mainly in emphasis."
12. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961); R. DWORKIN, supra note
1, at 14-45.
13. The concept of "open texture" is derived from Friedrich Waismann.
Waismann, Verifiability, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 122 (A. Flew, ed. 1965). See H.L.A.
HART, supra note 12, at 249. Dworkin clerked for Judge Learned Hand during 1957-58.
14. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 81.
15. Richards, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 2, at 1338.
16. Id
17. Dworkin's essays in the pages of the New York Review of Books have
touched on civil disobedience, reverse discrimination (three times), the Nixon Supreme
Court, and the legislation of morality (homosexuality, prostitution, and pornography).
See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, chapters 5, 8, 9, and 10; Dworkin, Why Bakke Has No
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has provided an articulation of and justification for the position
taken by "liberals" with respect to each of these. 8 His articles thus
respond to a crying need: while the spokespersons of both the conservative right and the radical left have been able to draw upon
underlying theoretical bases (laissez faire and Marxist economics
respectively), the modern liberal position, prior to Dworkin, had little legal or political theory on which it could rely.
Thus, for example, we may view Dworkin's initial concern
about judicial discretion as a response to criticisms of the Warren
Court from the right. The critics suggested that the Supreme Court
was guilty of acting like a legislature; that the justices were enacting their own political preferences rather than defending the existing law of the land. 9 Often the liberal position responded that the
Court was the conscience of the country. Its decisions were merely
vindications of the Bill of Rights. 0 But that claim rested upon twin
unvalidated (indeed, unexplored) assumptions: First, it required a
denial of the possibility of judicial discretion. If the justices were to
be defended from the charge of capriciousness, it would have to be
demonstrated that their actions were not optional, but were required by the definition of their political task. Second, their practice
of relying upon underlying principles as a source of authority would
have to be vindicated. Such underlying political principles would
have to be shown to be not merely one of many sources of judicial
legislation. They must be the sole basis for any response to the existence of a gap in the law. In discussing these two assumptions,2'
Dworkin validates the liberal approval of the Warren Court's actions
both procedurally, by demonstrating that the justices had a duty to
seek out an underlying political theory, and substantively, by
demonstrating that the particular political theory of this country required the specific holdings reached in their important rights-based
decision making.
What is the Rights Thesis?
Over time, Dworkin's various defenses of the liberal political
model have yielded a coherent and exciting theory of law, and parCase, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 10, 1977, at 11; Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights
Act, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 20, 1979, at 37.
18. See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113 (S. Hampshire, ed., 1978).
19. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1959).
20. See, e.g., Proceedings of Friday, April 10, 1959, 4 S. TEX. L.J. 179, 190
(1959); Rostow, The Court and Its Critics, 4 S. TEX. L.J. 160, 177 (1959).
21. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, chs. 4 and 12, respectively.
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ticularly of judicial decision-making. His distaste for judicial discretion has led him to outline a demanding but intuitively appealing
regimen for judges faced with hard cases.
Judges have a duty to seek out, determine, apply, and enforce
the pre-existing rights of the parties to the cases presented to
them." Citizens have institutional rights, based on the content of the
legal system.2 3 Among-these institutional rights is the right, which
may be possessed by one of the parties to a lawsuit, to a favorable
decision in that case." If such a right exists, the judge must seek it
out and abide by it.
Such an institutional right may be relatively uncontroversial,
as is the case when there exists a settled rule of law directly on
point. But, as Hart pointed out, there are many cases for which no
such rule exists. There are gaps in our system of rules.25 The heart
of Dworkin's argument is that institutional rights are not coterminous with legal rules. When the rules are apparently exhausted,
rights may nevertheless be present and dispositive."6 There are,
specifically, background rights that underlie the legal system.
These, no less than legal rules, may be a source of a litigant's institutional right to prevail in a particular case."
The judge's responsibility then, is to ferret out the background
rights when no settled rule of law disposes of a case. The legal principles that embody background rights are distinguished, at least experientially, from the rules of the system by being implicit and
unstated. A complex process of critical induction is needed to ascertain precisely what is captured by these principles.28
The process of critical induction is not Dworkin's invention. Its
roots are in the natural law philosphy of Aquinas, who suggested
that natural law could be ascertained by the application of human
reason.' Given the empirical data which we observe-whether it be
the motion of the planets or the rules of a legal system-we can intuit back to an underlying theory on which such observations may
22. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 81.
23. Id at 93, 101-05.
24. Id at 279-80.
25. H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 121-32.
26. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 279-80.
27. Id at 93, 101-02.
28. This process is discussed at some length in Richards, The Theory of Adjudication and the Task of the Great Judge, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 171 (1979).
29. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Treatise on Law, Question 90, First Article,
in 2 BAsIc WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 742-44 (A.C. Pegis ed. 1945).
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be based. By applying Occam's razor-which favors the least complex among several competing possible explanations otherwise not
relevantly distinguishable-we may well ascertain a single best underlying explanatory theory." Of course, we will not have demonstrated the absolute validity of that theory, for we cannot observe
its tenets or test our hypotheses directly. We can only argue that,
so long as our model continues to fit new observations, it at least
presents an adequate guess. And, of course, competing models may
garner competing adherents, so that at any given time there may be
several conflicting theories which nevertheless fit existing observation sufficiently well that, even while we espouse a particular one,
we cannot claim that those who espouse another have fundamentally
3
misconstrued their inductive task. 1
In this way, Dworkin's rights thesis proceeds on two levels at
once. He asserts that judges have a duty to engage in this sort of
critical induction when faced with a hard case. And he argues, or at
least seems to argue, in favor of a particular constellation of principles that underlie our own legal system. This article is concerned
primarily with one aspect of the former claim.
That claim calls on judges to seek out a set of principles
underlying the existing legal system whenever they are faced with a
case without a clearly settled answer. They should emulate
Dworkin's superjudge Hercules by searching for a single political
theory that best fits the empirically observable legal behavior (such
as settled legal rules). Once they have found that theory, they must
ask which of the litigants possesses an institutional right to prevail
when those principles, as well as the settled rules, are taken into account.
What is the Right Answer Hypothesis?
H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudence cannot accept principles as a
source of law unless fundamental changes are worked on what Hart
calls the "rule of recognition."'" That rule provides for a pedigree,
telling us whether any particular proposition is or is not a proposition of law. 3 By tracing the genesis of a particular proposition, we
30. See Chaitin, Randomness and Mathematical Proof, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
May, 1975, at 47, 48-49.
31. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 128-29.
32. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 97-107; R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at
39-45, 64-68.
33. We might view Hart's model as an instrumental application of deductive
logic to jurisprudence. Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § I B. Thus, the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1980], Art. 1
378

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

can determine whether it is a -part of the system of rules. But principles cannot be validated by any realistic rule of recognition, since
we have only an inductive basis for hypothesizing their existence.
Hart's model provides an essential deductive tool for analyzing legal
4
cases, but it provides nothing for the instances when that rule fails.
Dworkin's rights thesis does not contradict the broad strokes of
Hart's theory, when Hart's positivism works. But it adds an important next step for when that theory falls short: when deduction fails,
try critical induction. 5
In a Platonic sense, the conflict between the two may be resolved. If Dworkin is correct that, as a matter of theory, there is a
single "best" set of principles underlying any plausible legal system,
then once that set of principles is identified it may serve as part of
that system's rule of recognition. But it cannot be positively identified from within the legal system, since by definition we do not
possess adequate tools to do so. As a practical matter, then,

rule of recognition provides a single undefined assumption, against which we can
evaluate the various axioms (rules) of our system. Propositions of law are
demonstrably true (or false) by application of the rule of recognition and the primary
and secondary rules. The rule of recognition itself provides a recursive rule for determining whether any given proposition is a theorem of the system. See H. DELONG, A
PROFILE OF MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 152-60 (1970).
34. By accepting the notion of open texture, Hart implicitly admits that there
are propositions which are neither true nor false within his deductive system and for
which no recursive rule exists. His use of deduction, then, avoids being reductionist.
Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § I B. The instrumental use of deduction
may be seen to be the unifying element linking the various versions of positivism.
35. If we carry the logical deduction analogy further, Dworkin's rule is not
recursive; there is no way to be certain that application of his rule will necessarily
determine whether any given proposition is a theorem of the system within a finite
number of steps. To the extent that this is true, Dworkin's model differs from Hart's
in its treatment of hard cases. But, though Dworkin seems to feel that he has avoided
cases without answers, he has merely glossed them over. Assuming that the legal
system is capable of dealing with potentially infinite sets of fact patterns, such intractable cases must continue to exist. The advantage of Dworkin's theory over Hart's lies
in its power of expression, not its ability to provide answers. Thus, Hart's logical
model cannot even express the cases for which no answer exists, those spawned by the
law's open texture. Dworkin's provides expression for them, but cannot provide
answers. We are tempted, however, to believe that such answers exist, simply because
the questions may be phrased. This temptation is similar to that which existed concerning the formalization of arithmetic in the early part of this century. I discuss the
necessity of uncertainty to any theory of law founded upon a logical base in Farago,
supra note 8, at § IV B. The basic arguments of that article are summarized in the text
at notes 43-59, infrL For a description of the analogous development in arithmetic, see
H. DELONG, supra note 34, at 1-187.
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Dworkin's thesis differs fundamentally from Hart's. Furthermore,
Dworkin focuses on process rather than pedigree. Institutional
rights are validated by a continuous process of comparison and
reevaluation. The underlying set of principles must change as
necessary, in order to fit a changing body of empirical observation.
Thus, it would be troublesome to seek to capture that collection of
norms, once and for all, and stabilize them as part of a relatively
static rule of recognition." Dworkin's validating mechanism thereby
differs qualitatively from that of Hart.37
This conflict between the two philosophers cannot be
underestimated. Dworkin convincingly demonstrates that Hart's notion of open texture, though necessary within the model that Hart
develops, is over-inclusive when it suggests that judges will be
without guidance for many cases. In these, Dworkin would argue
that one of the parties has a right to prevail (and the judge,
therefore, a correlative duty so to rule). But does this destroy utterly the utility of the concept of open texture?
The fact that there are important sources of judicial guidance
other than legal rules is not an argument that these sources
necessarily close up all of the gaps. Consider, for example, the
sergeant who is told by his lieutenant to pick his five most intelligent men for a particularly complex assignment." Initially, this
order appears unambiguous because in each soldier's file there is a
rating of intelligence based on an objective test. To the sergeant's
dismay, however, there are ten men with identical scores on the
test, all of whom are tied for first place. Hart's model would
presumably tell the sergeant that he should select at random (or on
any basis he desires) among these men. But Dworkin's theory would
take him a step further. It tells him to look for the principles
underlying the lieutenant's command. Precisely what sorts of intelligence will this mission require? If two men are equally intelligent, will courage or brute strength be more important to the
mission's success? Is there any experience that would be particular36. Self-reference in the law is discussed in the text accompanying notes
79-86, infra, and in Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, §§ I C, IV B.
37. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 64-68. It is also an integral element of
Dworkin's theory that the "rule of recognition" which identifies legal principles must
call for a variety of internal moral and political judgments. See N. MACCORMICK,
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 240-46 (1978).
38. The example is based on one of Dworkin's. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at
32. A parallel argument concerning the validity and utility of scientific theories which
answer some questions but leave others open has been made by Waismann. Waismann,
supra note 13, at 138-39.
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ly helpful to the success of the mission? The answer to these and
similar questions undoubtedly will guide the sergeant further in his
choice. Yet even though the sergeant may have substantially less
discretion than appeared initially, is there anything about the sum
total of the sergeant's guidelines (both rules and principles) that absolutely eliminates the possibility that two or more individuals
will all be equally qualified and that the selection will ultimately
have to be made by the sergeant's exercise of absolute discretion?
Clearly not. The rights thesis cabins judicial uncertainty, but it
does, not appear to eliminate it.39 The claim that the application of
the rights thesis will always lead to a single correct answer (one and
only one institutional right), is a separate and distinguishable claim.
That claim, which I will call the "right answer hypothesis," seems
historically important to the development of the rights thesis. It is
closely related (though not identical) to Dworkin's discomfort with
judicial discretion, from which the entire theory seems to have
grown.' ° If it were demonstrably true, it would serve as a compelling
justification of many of Dworkin's normative claims, particularly the
claim that not only do judges utilize the rights thesis in practice,
they should utilize it as a matter of sound political theory.' Perhaps
because the right answer hypothesis is so tightly bound up with the
origins and potential justification of the rights thesis, Dworkin has
sought to validate that hypothesis as an integral part of his theory.
There are, however, fundamental problems with doing so. As I
elaborate elsewhere (and in summary in the following section),
uncertainty is a necessary element of the rights thesis." There will
continue to be an important group of cases that remain intractable,
even after application of the Herculean decision-making efforts
which Dworkin prescribes. And, because this is the case, the two
essays in which the right answer hypothesis is defended differ from
most of Dworkin's work. Their arguments are less clear, their line of
reasoning more obscure. Most importantly, however, although they
take the form of a defense of the hypothesis against a variety of
arguments, they uniformly ignore the strongest among these.
THE CERTAINTY OF UNCERTAINTY

If there is a single weakness that runs throughout Professor
Dworkin's work, it is an underestimation of the value and impor39.
40.

See N. MACCORMICK, supra note 37, at 249-50, 251.
See text accompanying notes 72-78, infra.

41.

See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 123.

42.

Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § IV A.
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tance of uncertainty in the law. I would argue that, as a matter of
theory, uncertainty will be particularly difficult to banish from any
legal theory. And, as a matter of practice, it is impossible to avoid. I
would go further and urge that uncertainty is in some ways vital to
our very conception of what law is, and this fact explains why
Dworkin's theory has garnered so much attention. 3
After all, the rights thesis purports to be a general theory of
what law is," but it nevertheless is silent about the role of constitutions, the duties and responsibilities of legislatures,'5 the functioning
of the criminal law," and the disposition of the overwhelming majority of the cases that come before the judiciary-the "easy" ones.' 7
But though Dworkin's voice is muted in all of these arenas, his work
demands and receives considerable attention.
The reason for this is that he, more than anyone else before,
has pointed to the pivotal role that hard cases play in the law." His
theory has, from its very beginnings, been grounded in issues of
judicial discretion and the adjudication of hard cases." It is Dworkin,
therefore, whose work has captured, or at least examined, an essential truth that has evaded the other regnant theories of law. By embracing the hard cases, the exceptions to the rules espoused by
other theories, Dworkin implicitly expresses the intuitive claim that
no theory of law can be satisfying so long as it fails to acknowledge
the fundamental import of the role of uncertainty in the law.
Dworkin is correct, then, in rebelling against other theories
(such as Hart's) that relegate hard cases to the judicial hinterlands
as rare or unimportant exceptions to what law is really about." The
43. See Nickel, Dworkin on the Nature and Consequences of Rights, 11 GA.
L. REV. 1115, 1142 (1977).
44. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at vii-ix, xi-xii, 123.
45. The closest he has approached this question is his recent discussion of
statutory interpretation. Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, supra note 17.
46. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 94, 100 (Dworkin here acknowledges
that his theory merely "touches on" criminal law).
47. Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin
Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473, 505-06 (1977).
48. See e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593, 615 (1958); Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in ETHICS
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 171, 172 (H. Kiefer & M. Munitz eds. 1970) (acknowledging that the
hard cases exist at the frontiers of his theory of law and have not yet been explained
or understood); Weaver, Herber Hercules, and the Plural Society A Knot in the
Social Bond, 41 MODERN L. REV. 660, 660 (1978).
49. Dworkin, 60 J. PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 626; Dworkin, Philosophy and
the Critique of Law, in RULE OF LAW 147, 153-54 (1971); see R. DWORKIN, supra note 1,
chs. 2 and 4.
50.

R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 14-22.
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regimen that Dworkin demands of his Hercules is admirabl,- because
it forces the judge and the parties to deal with uncertainty.
Dworkin's model does not permit the system to disown any cases,
and it requires it to answer all those for which an answer exists. By
cutting away all else, Dworkin exposes the nerve of the law: the intractable cases. But just as he does so he vitiates his own insight by
insisting on the truth of the right answer hypothesis. The intuitive
excitement of his theory, its apparent recognition of the importance
and centrality of uncertainty in the law, is made to disappear by a
philosophical sleight of hand."
These are strong assertions. Some rely on experience and intuition. But at their heart, they rely on the demonstration that uncertainty is, in fact, unavoidable in any practical legal theory.
Specifically, within the rights thesis we will expect uncertainty to
arise from four separable potential sources.
The rights thesis argues that judges facing difficult cases
should seek inductively to reconstruct an underlying political theory
embedded within a collection of legal principles. Once such a theory
is identified, it should be applied to the specific fact pattern involved, and an outcome should be determined. Initially, then, this
presents two levels of inquiry. First, the fundamental norms should
be identified; then they should be applied. Uncertainty could enter
at either level.
At the first level, the judge must identify a set of principles
that underlies the legal system. But why should that set of principles be unique? Dworkin argues that it should be the set which
52
"best" accounts for existing empirically observable legal behavior.
We are, however, familiar with many areas in which there may be
multiple "bests."
Economics provides the most exact analogy: Microeconomic
theory assumes that the choice of goods any consumer will purchase
results from a multivalent balancing of many inputs. At any given
income level there will be continuous trade-offs between any pair of
goods. These trade-offs yield an entire surface (in as many dimensions as there are goods to select among), representing an optimal
allocation of income. By definition the consumer will be indifferent
as between any two points on that surface, and each will represent
51. See Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory
of Common-Law Adjudication, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 783 (1978).
52. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 66. See also R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at
66-68, 126-28, 340-41; Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 30-31.
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an optimal (or best) allocation of income. Thus, there will likely be
an infinite number of "bests." 3
Similarly, there may well be many possible legal theories that
would account for the existing observable legal behaviors. And
many of these may seem equally good. Furthermore, for reasons
that I detail later, the technique we use for narrowing the field in
related sorts of inquiry (such as the scientific method) is inappropriate here.' The virtue of simplicity of explanatory force
(Occam's razor), relies upon assumptions that we cannot make about
the law.
Assume, however, that we have somehow narrowed the field to
only one set of principles. This does not mean that uncertainty has
been exiled from our theory, for there is nothing about that single
set of principles which suggests that they would necessarily yield a
single substantively certain answer to every question of law. Indeed,
I argue that no finite set of starting assumptions can possibly yield
a correct outcome in every conceivable legal case.5"
Thus, uncertainty may enter at either level. There may be conflicting best theories, or a single best theory may leave the outcome
uncertain for at least some cases. It is possible to divide these
sources of uncertainty still further, however, and to recognize that
at each of these two levels uncertainty may arise for either of two
reasons.
In choosing among potential best theories we can distinguish
between theories that are tied, and those that derive from contradicting sources of authority. This distinction reflects an ambiguity in
Dworkin's definition of his concept of a "best" explanatory theory. It
is unclear whether all potential theories may be compared on a continous scale. If, on the one hand, they can, then there exists a continuous scale on which to evaluate competing theories, and we cannot
rule out the possibility that two theories will be equally good according to our criterion. There may be, in short, a tie. But if, on the
other hand, our theories are incommensurable, we may well be left
with a large number of theories that simply cannot be compared to
one another.5
53. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 34-44 (2d ed., 1975); P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 443-47 (10th ed., 1976).
54. Text accompanying notes 169-73, infra.
55. Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § IV B.
56. See Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFF. 3, 9
(1977); cf. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 359-60.
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An example of the first sort of uncertainty is the sergeant's
choice on the basis of the soldiers' intelligence as defined by the test
scores in their files. Ten of the soldiers, according to this single continuous criterion, are equally intelligent. The criterion provides no
basis for judging among them. Similarly, two or more competing
legal theories might be equally good when measured against some
continuous metric. Litigants might be able to appeal to competing,
equally balanced, sets of background rights.
Alternatively, suppose that the sergeant does not have comparable test scores for each of his men. Intelligence tests are actually clusters of examinations testing a collection of different and
not necessarily related types of intelligence. Suppose that all the information that the sergeant has about any one soldier is the subscore from one of these scales. Thus he will know that Private
Adams has a considerable amount of general knowledge, Private
Brown can repeat long strings of numbers he has heard only once,
Private Connors can deal very well with spatial relations, and so on
through the squad. Without some further basis for comparing these
sorts of intelligence, the sergeant may be without guidance in his
decision, and different soldiers might be "most intelligent" according
to different and incommensurable intellectual metrics. Similarly, the
definition of what it means for a legal theory to be "best" might be
such that many theories would also be incommensurable. Litigants
might be able to appeal to incomparable sets of background rights.
The same distinction between ties and conflicting sources of
authority could be applied to outcomes generated by any particular
"best" set of principles. Such a set of principles might not exclude a
situation in which, when all the arguments of principle are weighed
and balanced, the two litigants are tied. The scales are at equipoise.
This would yield a situation in which neither party had a clear institutional right to prevail. Finally, nothing about the rights thesis
would seem to require that the principles we select need necessarily
be internally consistent. In fact, I argue that absolute consistency
would be impossible if the principles would yield an outcome for
every conceivable case. Like incommensurable "best" theories, contradiction within a single theory leads us to conflicting outcomes
without providing a basis for selecting between them. We may find,
that is, that each of the parties has an institutional right to prevail.57
None of these four sources of uncertainty is incompatible with
the basic thrust of the rights thesis. In fact, though Dworkin rejects
57.

MacCormick, Dworkin as Pre-Benthamite, 87

(1978).
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the possibility of incommensurable best sets of principles (without
demonstrating why that should be the case)," he accepts the
possibility of ties on both levels, and simply ignores the possibility
of paradoxical outcomes. 9
There are, then, at least four sources of potential uncertainty,
even within the rights thesis. The judge seeking a best set of
underlying legal principles may find that two or more such sets exist, either because their explanatory force is equal (they are tied) or
because their explanatory force emanates from distinct and noncomparable sources (they are incommensurable). Similarly, even
after a single best theory is selected, uncertainty may arise either
because that theory is at equipoise with respect to the rights of a
particular set of litigants or because the theory provides contradictory institutional rights for each of the parties.
RECURRING FALLACIES

If I am correct, then, the rights thesis does not and cannot exclude the potential for uncertainty within any given legal system.
Professor Dworkin would, I think, agree."0 But he argues that such
uncertainty is necessarily exceedingly rare and that judicial discretion may be totally absent from a sophisticated legal system."1 And
he couches these arguments in essays entitled, "Can Rights Be Controversial?" and "No Right Answer?" which seem to suggest that
uncertainty is not merely rare, but conceptually unnecessary. 2
Finally, although he routinely accepts the existence of certain forms
of uncertainty, his arguments so denigrate the importance of their
existence that many commentators read these essays as flat rejections of any meaningful uncertainty in the law. 8
Taken together, these two essays constitute an effective rebut
58. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 360.
59. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 285-87; Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra
note 1, at 29-32; text accompanying notes 90-179, infra.
60. Dworkin does, after all, acknowledge at least the possibility of tie decisions. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 29-32. This is by no means clear,
however, particularly if TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, is the sole basis for
our interpretation of Dworkin's theory. See Coleman, Book Review (TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY), 66 CAL. L. REV. 885, 908, 910 (1978); MacCormick, 87 PHILOSOPHICAL REV.,
supra note 57, at 591.
61. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1.
62. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 279-90; Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra
note 1.
63. Note 60, supra, and R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 285-87.
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tal to a new breed of legal realist, whom we might call "principle
skeptics." Dworkin seems particularly concerned to protect the
rights thesis from the claims of this group. Their argument would
run roughly as follows: We accept the notion of legal rules, which
after all are clearly settled and seem to impose some sort of duty on
judges faced with them. But we cannot accept this vague and indeterminate talk of principles which seem to be mere ghosts of legal
rules. Indeed, the very vagueness of these norms argues against
their existence, for how can it be claimed that any controversial
question possesses a single correct answer?
To the best of my knowledge, no genuine principle skeptics exist. Perhaps this is because Dworkin was careful to undermine their
arguments before they could even be adequately phrased. I suspect,
however, that it is more likely that principle skepticism is without
serious appeal as a philosophical argument. The argument that is
commonly phrased is more defensible, and resembles the one that I
have already suggested. Although Dworkin's introduction of principles to the act of judging is an important step forward, he has not
exhausted the need for some theoretical acceptance of uncertainty
as an implicit part of the decision-making enterprise. 4
Dworkin's two essays often seem to address this concern, but
in practice they leave it unscathed. The remainder of this article is
devoted to a careful examination of the reasons why we may reject
the right answer hypothesis even after we have read all that Professor Dworkin seems to say in its defense.
I begin by noting five fallacies that recur in the two essays addressed to the right answer hypothesis. First, Dworkin seems to
equate theoretical uncertainty in the law with practical controversy.
Second, he equates uncertainty in the law with the availability of
judicial discretion. Third, he ignores the crucial self-referential quality of judicial decision-making. Fourth, he fails to distinguish between certainty in the law and the completeness of a legal system.
And, finally, his work seems to obscure the difference that I have
just outlined between the right answer hypothesis on the one hand
and principle skepticism on the other.
Uncertainty and Controversy
Dworkin seems primarily concerned with arguments arising
from the controversial nature of many judicial decisions."5 But con64. See, e.g., Perry, 88 ETHICS, supra note 7.
65. For example, chapter 12 of R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, is entitled "Can
Rights Be Controversial?"
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troversy is itself an ambiguous term, and it is by no means
synonymous with theoretical uncertainty. We will especially want to
introduce a distinction between theory and practice in jurisprudential argument."
Theoretical arguments are not necessarily workable ones. It
may be useful to discuss the theoretical nature of a legal system,
even when we know that any observation of the system in practice
will be tainted, less than pure. The distinction here is similar to the
one that exists between theoretical physics and engineering. The
former is concerned with abstract conceptual model making; the latter is a less than ideal application of theory to the real world. It is
in the nature of our tools, our devices for measurement, and the
crudeness of our own senses that we can never operate in practice
at the level of precision that we can hypothesize.
Controversy in normative systems would seem to be a creature
of this disjunction between theory and practice. Even though we
may acknowledge that there is a theoretically correct answer to a
normative question, our techniques of critical judgment may be too
fallible or not sensitive enough to ascertain the content of that
answer with absolute precision. Thus, different judges seeking to
replicate one another's thought experiments may legitimately reach
opposing results. There may, in short, be controversy.
But their controversy is not an argument that no judge can be
correct to the exclusion of the others. It is merely an acknowledgement that we cannot tell which of them has reached the right solution. To the extent that a correct answer does exist, the persistence
of controversy is simply a continuing reminder of our own limitations. 7
Controversy, however, may also be used to express a
theoretical claim. We may wish to assert that some question is inherently controversial. We may wish, that is, to assert that
arguments will persist not because of the limits of our senses, but
because of the abstract nature of the question involved. 8
Whichever definition of "controversy" we accept, the concept is
significantly different from uncertainty in the law. And it is the latter to which the right answer hypothesis is addressed. The two,
66. See Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § I.
67. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN. supra note 1, at 280-81.
68. See Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167 (1965); see also Soper, 75 MICH. L. REV.. supra note 47, at 488.
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however, are not unrelated, and this relationship may be the source
of considerable confusion.
Of the four potential sources of uncertainty within the rights
thesis, two will yield theoretical controversy and two may yield
practical controversy: If our definition of a best set of principles
relies upon incommensurable metrics, we may well continue to
argue over which of our proposed opposing theories is the proper
one. If, for instance, we are critics engaged in an argument over
whether Van Gogh's Starry Night is a better work of art than
Bruckner's Seventh Symphony we will likely argue until exhaustion.
Whatever standards we may be able to develop and articulate about
the assessment of works of art within a particular genre, they will
likely be incommensurable across genres. There is no aesthetic
philosopher's stone that could reduce all of our judgments to some
common metric and allow us to compare these two works.
Similarly, if there is a paradox within a single best set of principles, a theoretical and irresolvable controversy will exist. If the
sovereign has commanded that all left-handed persons be taxed, and
has similarly commanded that all blond-haired persons be exempt,
absent any rule for ranking these commands with respect to one
another there will be an essential, continuing, and theoretical controversy: How should a blond-haired, left-handed person be treated?
Thus, either of these sorts of uncertainty will yield a controversy that cannot be avoided. Ties, either between competing sets of
principles or between outcomes posited under a single specific best
theory, are another matter entirely. The tie decision need not be
controversial at all. If we view equipoise as one of an infinite
number of possible points on a continuous metric, the accuracy of
calling a decision a tie will be essentially identical to the accuracy of
making any judgment within the system. To the extent that the
practical limitations of our techniques make it impossible to be absolutely certain that our judgment accurately reflects the
theoretically correct outcome, all of our decisions will be more or
less suspect, and this will include the tie decision. 9
Of course, not all controversy will reflect theoretical uncertainty. Where our techniques are relatively clumsy, many close cases
may engender practical controversy even though they have a
theoretically correct solution." And not all uncertainty will be con69.
70.

R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 285-87.
See Sartorius, 11 GA. L. REV., supra note 3; note 116 infra.
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troversial. Where our techniques are relatively sophisticated, many
tie decisions will seem to be uncontroversially uncertain -we will all
agree (or at least very many of us will agree) that the interests of
the parties are at equipoise.7 We should therefore be cautious about
confusing the two concepts. This caution, however, is not always
heeded in Dworkin's essays.
Uncertainty and Discretion
There is, then, an important difference between uncertainty
within a legal system and controversy over the outcomes generated
by that system. There is an equally crucial line that may be drawn
between judicial uncertainty and judicial discretion. Dworkin,
however, often glosses over the distinction by equating the availability of judicial discretion with the existence of theoretical uncertainty. In doing so he simply echoes H.L.A. Hart's tacit assumption
that where there are gaps in the law judges must exercise discretion.72
It is precisely this claim that seems most to have concerned
Professor Dworkin in his initial forays against Hart's positivism. He
sought to demonstrate the impropriety of judicial discretion, not the
impossibility of legal uncertainty.7" Of course, one way to
demonstrate the bankruptcy of judicial discretion would be to show
that the law always provides a theoretically certain outcome. A
judge exercising discretion in the face of such an outcome could be
criticized for failing to fulfill an important duty. But this argument
only works in one direction. Its converse is not necessarily true;
even if we eliminate discretion from the law, we may nevertheless
have to respond to legally uncertain questions.
It is not surprising that this important distinction is not
remarked upon by Hart. Where uncertainty exists, the practical
arguments favoring discretion over other arbitrary techniques for
reaching a conclusion seem quite compelling. Once the necessity of
uncertainty is clear, the remedy for it may well be relatively uncontroversial. But the distinction becomes critically important when
Dworkin introduces arguments phrased against discretion rather
than uncertainty.
71. Id. at 1274-75.
72. H.L.A. HART. supra note 12, at 77-96, 125-27, 201. Other assumptions are
also possible. See Coleman, 66 CAL. L. REV., supra note 60, at 912.
73. See Dworkin, 60 J. PHILOSOPHY. supra note 1; R. DWORKIN. supra note 1,
ch. 2.
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Because we tend to accept discretion as the remedy for uncertainty, policy arguments against discretion appear to be policy
arguments against the existence of gaps in the law. But the connection is a false one. The two concepts are necessarily distinct.
Moreover, the nature of their difference is particularly helpful in
understanding the source of the confusion that they may spawn.
Uncertainty is an observable, empirical part of the legal behavior
for which any theory must provide an account. Judicial discretion,
on the other hand, is a procedural technique. It is only one of a large
number of ways in which a system may respond to the existence of
uncertainty.
For this reason, it is possible to express policy arguments
against judicial discretion. It has no theoretical or empirical source,
but is simply a technical response to a particular theoretical difficulty. It may well be a flawed response, and there may well be (though
few of us may think there are) better ways to deal with the existence of uncertainty. We can discuss the merits and problems of
judicial discretion and disagree about whether, on balance, it is the
best solution to our problem.
If we do not keep this particular distinction clear, however- if,
that is we equate judicial discretion (a solution) with legal uncertainty (the underlying problem)-we open ourselves to a profound
sort of logical error. So long as we understand the way in which the
two differ, we will recognize that policy arguments against judicial
discretion necessarily lead us to ask whether a better response exists to the problem of uncertainty in the law. But when we lose
sight of the disjunction, we may be tempted to accept a description
of the shortcomings of judicial discretion as an argument that legal
uncertainty cannot exist.
That argument has a limited sort of validity. The conclusion
that uncertainty cannot exist is, of course, unacceptable. But we
may acknowledge that arguments against judicial discretion (particularly when that appears to be the best available response to
uncertainty) suggest that uncertainty should not exist. Uncertainty
may be essential to any legal system, but the weakness of judicial
discretion urges us to keep uncertainty to its absolute minimum.
Thus, if properly phrased, an argument against discretion may have
an impact upon the way in which we go about deciding what sort of
processes we will want to accept for our legal system. But it does
not address the right answer hypothesis directly, and, by definition,
must yield to any argument which does.
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Certainty and Completeness
A third important distinction that is often passed over by
Dworkin is the one that I have made between legal certainty and
legal completeness." This is roughly parallel to the difference between substance and procedure in law (and therefore is related to
the distinction between uncertainty and discretion). 5 It is precisely
the difference between the claim in any particular case that one particular litigant has a right to a particular outcome, and the claim
that both litigants have the right to insist that the court reach some
outcome. 6
The latter is a claim that the legal system is complete; it includes both a definition of its own jurisdiction, enumerating the
cases over which it asserts authority, and a definition of the way in
which its authority will be exercised. Every legal case will have an
answer, but it is by no means true that every case (or, for that matter, all but a small handfull of cases) will have a specific, theoretically antecedently determinable, unitary correct outcome.
Thus, we can imagine a legal system in which very few legal
cases have substantively certain results. Suppose that judges toss
coins to determine the winner of a lawsuit. Or that they select the
more attractive litigant as the winner, or the litigant with the
shorter name or the greater wealth. Any of these would produce a
decision, and we might have important social reasons for wanting an
authoritative source of decisions, even when we could not have
guessed antecedently what those decisions would be.
Alternatively, of course, we might want to have extensive
substantive content to our law. We might want to have a theory,
that is, which justifies not only the process whereby a decision is
reached, but also the content of the decision itself. This would provide substantive certainty for the law, in addition to procedural
completeness.
Litigants will have rights both when the system is certain and
when it is complete. But the nature of their rights will differ
significantly. In a complete legal system, all litigants will have a procedural right to an outcome (and more particularly an outcome
legitimated by a specific process). In a certain system, an individual
74.
75.
in logic.
76.

Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § I B.
It is also parallel to the difference between semantic and syntactic truth
Richards, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV.. supra note 2, at 1314-16.
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litigant may have a highly specific substantive right to a particular
outcome.
One effect of this distinction relates to the availability of
judicial discretion. The existence of a substantive right to a particular outcome banishes discretion. If rights have any meaning at
all, they must function as trumps." When present, they create a correlative duty on the part of a judge to abide by them. Thus, a judge
faced with a litigant who has a substantive right has no legitimate
basis for making a discretionary decision. But the existence of procedural rights need not have any impact at all on judicial discretion.
Judicial discretion is, in fact, merely one form of procedural determination of outcome that might be utilized by a legal system."8 And,
though substantive rights are fundamentally incompatible with
judicial discretion, the latter may coexist quite peacefully with the
existence of procedural rights.
The distinction has even greater import for the right answer
hypothesis. That claim is precisely the claim that a legal system will
be simultaneously procedurally complete and substantively certain.
For every case there will be an outcome, and that outcome will be
substantively determinable. Thus, to demonstrate the validity of the
right answer hypothesis it is necessary to demonstrate the existence of coincident procedural and substantive rights in every
possible case. If this distinction is not honored, it becomes deceptively easy to confuse an argument in favor of the existence of an
answer in every case, for an argument in favor of a specific answer
in every case.
Judicial Self-Reference
Cybernetics is the study of self-regulatory mechanisms,
mechanisms that can monitor themselves and change their own
state." One of the most persistent jurisprudential questions is
whether the judicial process is in this sense a cybernetic one.
Dworkin repeatedly assumes that judges discover, rather than
create, the law."0 This assumption is itself terribly controversial and,

77. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at xi.
78. Whether or not discretion should be incorporated into a particular system
is a policy matter of the sort discussed briefly at notes 72-73, supra, and at greater
length in the conclusion, at notes 179-91, infra.

79. See generally, N. WIENER, CYBERNETICS: OR CONTROL & COMMUNICATION IN
THE ANIMAL & THE MACHINE (2d ed. 1961).
80. R. DWORKIN. supra note 1, at 280, 281-82, 293.
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I believe, essentially unsupportable." It assumes that the acts of
judges are not cybernetic, that they have no impact on the content
of the law.
Certainly, to the extent that all legal questions are ultimately
answered by a legislature or a dictator," it may be possible to have
a system in which the judiciary plays no law-creative role. But this
hardly seems an accurate description of any vital contemporary
system. 3 The common law is a creature of judicial creation. The
gravitational force that even Dworkin acknowledges accompanies
precedent is a way in which judges influence one another and the
law."
The point is not that judges write on a clean slate, or that they
may validly ignore the other makers, including other judges, of the
legal system in which they find themselves. Rather, it is that we
cannot strictly say that judges either create or discover law. They
do something in between. 5 Their decisions are made with reference
to their own decisions and those of other judges. They must in some
sense have jurisdiction over themselves and their process.
Judicial self-reference, the influence that the judiciary exerts
on the theoretical model that it uncovers, is a critical aspect of the
legal process. It has certain theoretical implications about the role of
uncertainty in the law, but these are of less import here. 8 In the
context of the right answer hypothesis, judicial self-reference argues
that we must be careful to compare the process of legal judgment
only with that of other, similarly cybernetic systems. Failing to do
so would permit us to simplify our task in a subtly fallacious way. It
is easier to address the right answer hypothesis when the system
against which we evaluate the "rightness" of our answers is totally
external to the system that generates them. Once the two can be
81. Even Sartorius concedes this point, urging only that judges make law in a
different way from the one in which legislators do. See Sartorius, Social Policy and
Judicial Legislation, 8 AM. PHILOSOPHY Q. 151, 159, 160 (1971).
82. Kenneth Arrow has demonstrated that recourse to a legislature will not
guarantee the absence of uncertainty in the law. K. ARROW. SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). I discuss these possibilities in Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV.,
supra note 8, at § IV C.
83. Nor is it the model Dworkin presents. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at
110-23.
84. Id. at 111-12.
85. See, e.g., Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 5, 55 (1978); Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823,
848; Summers, 63 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 51, at 710.
86. See Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at §§ I C, IV B.
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folded into one another, important complexities are triggered. But
when we analogize the law to a non-cybernetic system, we permit
our argument to ignore those complexities and we draw upon
subliminal assumptions that are not necessarily applicable to
systems which include self-reference.
The Right Answer Hypothesis and the No-Right-Answer Thesis
Finally, we should be aware of the distinction between two
very different claims. The first is that there is virtually always a
substantively correct answer to every legal question. This is what I
have been calling the right answer hypothesis. Second, there is the
claim that whenever the settled law does not provide an answer,
there is necessarily a theoretical uncertainty in the law. This appears to be the heart of what Professor Dworkin calls the no-rightanswer thesis.
While these two possible theses are in fact incompatible,
neither is the direct negation of the other. The right answer hypothesis is controverted by the claim that there remains some significant
group of intractable cases-cases with no right answer. We must
recognize that this intractability claim is much weaker than the noright-answer thesis, which would assert that all hard cases are
necessarily without solution. The no-right-answer thesis is controverted in turn by the claim that there exists at least one controversial case for which there is a right answer. And this, in turn,
is of course far weaker than the right answer hypothesis, and may
well be true even when that stronger claim proves to be false. The
rights thesis stripped of the right answer hypothesis makes precisely this weaker claim. We will therefore wish to be cautious lest we
confuse these four very separate propositions (a caution not always
heeded by Professor Dworkin). 7
87. Specifically, the four propositions outlined in the text may be represented
formulaically as follows:
x = a variable over the domain of hard cases
RA(x) = the fact that there exists a right answer to the problem posed
by hard case "x" (a variable)
1. no-right-answer thesis: (Vx)- RA(x)
(no hard case has a right answer)
2. rights thesis (- no-right-answer thesis):
(3x)RA(x)
(some hard cases have right answers)
3. right answer hypothesis: (Vx)RA(x)
(all hard cases have right answers)
4. intractability thesis (- right-answer hypothesis):
(3x)- RA(x)
(there are some cases which have no right answer)
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No one today, including I think H.L.A. Hart, would seriously
assert the truth of the no-right-answer thesis. It is a product of principle skepticism, and principle skeptics seem to inhabit the realm of
elves, gnomes, and trolls. We can conceive of them but we can't find
any.
I think it is equally implausible to assert the truth of the right
answer hypothesis, and I have gone to some length to demonstrate
the reasons for that belief." Nevertheless, Dworkin's essays on
judicial certainty are often taken to express precisely that claim,
perhaps because they frequently fail to distinguish between the noright-answer thesis and the right answer hypothesis.
Part of the reason for this confusion may be that Dworkin feels
that uncertainty is a theoretically rare and exceptional attribute of
any complex legal system. In fact, he suggests that it may be so
rare as to be unworthy of consideration. 9 To the extent that this is
An example of the sort of difficulty encountered in seeking to keep these
propositions straight is Dworkin's own apparent inability to identify clearly what he
means by the "no-right-answer thesis." In R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 279, that thesis
is implicitly linked to the argument that "there is sometimes no single right answer,
but only answers." As such, it would take the form of #4: there are some cases which
have no right answer. In Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, he notes that "it
has been debated under many titles, including the question whether judges always
have discretion in hard cases, and whether there are what some legal philosophers call
,gaps' in the law." Id at 2. These respectively translate into #1: no hard case has a
right answer, and #4: there are some cases which have no right answer. And in yet
another place Dworkin states that his claim against the no-right-answer thesis is
simply that, "there is often a single right answer to complex questions of law," R.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 279, which is a version of #2: some hard cases have right
answers (and which in turn is a controversion of #1: no hard case has a right answer).
As the above schema makes clear, for the purposes of this article I take the no-rightanswer thesis to be the strong claim I have designated as #1: no hard case has a right
answer. This has the virtue of meshing with at least some of Professor Dworkin's use
of the term, even if it is impossible to pin down a meaning which would coincide
perfectly with all that he has to say on the subject.
Still more difficulty arises because it is never clear whether Dworkin is asserting the right answer hypothesis or denying the no-right-answer thesis. The latter is indeed hostile to the rights thesis (as can be seen by comparing #1 and #2, above), and, if
asserted, would require refutation by Professor Dworkin. Disproving it, however,
would say little if anything about the necessity of uncertainty in the law (the intractability thesis, #4, above) or the role of discretion in responding to such uncertainty. The
former claim, conversely, is hostile to uncertainty and discretion, but is not a direct
corollary of the rights thesis. By muddying these various lines of definition, Dworkin
permits interpretations of his work which would assert that arguments favoring the
rights thesis (#2) disfavor judicial discretion (a sympton of #4). See also N. MACCORMICK, supra note 37, at 83.
88. Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § IV.
89. R. DWORKIN. supra note 1, at 286-87.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1980], Art. 1
396

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

true, the two theses are brought closer together. Thus, Dworkin
makes many perfectly valid arguments against the rather vaguely
articulated no-right-answer thesis. He virtually never addresses the
right answer hypothesis. But he argues in each essay that the
residue of uncertainty will necessarily be almost infinitesimal. And
this argument serves as a bridge linking the two claims. If it is true,
then all of his arguments against the no-right-answer thesis become
arguments in support of the right answer hypothesis.
For this reason, the scarcity argument he advances becomes
particularly important to Dworkin's essays. Unfortunately, it is the
weakest and most tentative of all his claims. Nevertheless, by linking his generally sound (if largely unnecessary) attack on the noright-answer thesis to his tenuous rarity argument, he encourages
his readers to believe that he has presented a strong case in support
of the right answer hypothesis.
In reading Dworkin's two essays, then, we will want to remain
alert to these five important distinctions. We should recognize that
arguments concerning controversy do not necessarily reach claims
concerning uncertainty. We will want to be wary not to assume that
an argument against the utility of judicial discretion is the
equivalent of an argument against the possibility of legal uncertainty. We must guard against confusing a claim of procedural completeness for an assertion of substantive certainty. We should bear
in mind the complexities that accompany self-referential systems.
And we will want to examine the scarcity claim quite closely in
order to evaluate the relation between the right answer hypothesis
and the no-right-answer thesis.
"CAN RIGHTS BE CONTROVERSIAL?"

The shorter and less complex of Professor Dworkin's two
forays into the right answer morass is the penultimate chapter of
Taking Rights Seriously." This is an abbreviated version of the second essay, "No Right Answer," which initially appeared in a collection of essays- written in honor of H.L.A. Hart,9 and which has
subsequently been revised and published in the New York University Law Review. 2 Although the two essays overlap conceptually,
they each present surprisingly distinct arguments, and each bears
independent evaluation.
90. R. DwoIRIN, supra note 1, at 279-90. This is the concluding chapter of the
hardcover edition.
91. See note 1, supra.
92. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 1.
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"Can Rights Be Controversial?", like much of Dworkin's prose,
employs a particularly devastating stylistic device. Dworkin sets up
his opponents' arguments with great clarity and even beauty, only
to demonstrate with still greater lucidity how those arguments are
hopelessly nugatory." In the process of doing so, however, the arguments that would have been most effective are somehow lost in the
shuffle. Only those that may be readily disposed of are laid out,
often to the accompaniment of any number of compliments about
their authors' skill or insight. Of course, once they are decimated,
the only conclusion we are left to draw is that Dworkin's own skill
and insight are even better still.
Using this technique, Dworkin sets up two versions of a noright-answer argument at the outset of the essay. The first, termed
the "practical" argument, is that even though one of the parties may
have the right to a particular conclusion, we are not justified in using the rights thesis in deciding the case because we lack the conceptual tools to determine to the satisfaction of all the interested
parties what the content of the existing right is." Clearly, this is a
practical argument about controversy, not uncertainty, and Dworkin
is right to reject it (though we may wonder why he would articulate
it at all). It is the argument that most human judges more closely
resemble Dworkin's fallible Herbert97 than they do his superhuman
Hercules.9" While we would scarcely deny such a claim, it is difficult
to view it as an argument against urging even the most fallible
human judge to emulate Hercules as closely as possible."
On some level the practical argument may also be a theoretical
one. It is possible that its hypothetical proponent is claiming not
only that we lack the tools to unearth the applicable rights in all

93. This sort of straw man argumentation also characterizes Freud's description of his own theory. See, e.g., S, FREUD. A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
PSYCHOANALYSIS 27-29 (rev. ed J. Riviere trans. 1943).
94. "How can so able a legal philosopher [Munzer] have gone so wrong here?"
R. DWORKIN. supra note 1, at 336; see generally R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 291-368.
A particularly telling insight into Professor Dworkin's attitude towards criticism is the
opening of the original version of the appendix to Taking Rights Seriously. Dworkin,
Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201 (1977).
95. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 280-81.
96. Id
97. Id at 125.
98. Id at 105-06.
99. This is an example of confusing controversy for uncertainty. See text
accompanying notes 65-71, supra.
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cases, but that those tools do not even exist."' Whether the argument
is phrased as an absolute or as a comment on a particular system,
however, Dworkin's criticism of it is perfectly accurate. He suggests
that the reason for adopting the rights thesis in some cases may not
itself sound in a substantive right of any of the parties. It may
derive instead from the simple pragmatic fact that the rights thesis
works better than other systems; that it is fairer, more practical, or
more dependable than other alternatives."'
Dworkin accurately asserts that his arguments in favor of the
rights thesis suggest that it is all of these. Thus, even if the rights
thesis occasionally lacks the theoretical tools to unearth the existing rights of the parties involved, it might nevertheless be
validated procedurally. Of course, while this is strictly true, it muddles the notions of certainty and completeness. Such a claim would
argue in favor of the rights thesis as a procedural mechanism for
reaching an answer, not as a substantive technique for determining
the answer.
Suppose that this version of the argument is true. Perhaps
rights are genuinely and theoretically unknowable, deriving from
the will of a capricious, irrational, and peculiarly laconic god. Can
there be such a thing as a legal right that is, by definition,
unknowable? Perhaps, perhaps not; it is a semantic question. If we
wanted to we could call such things "rights," just as we can call the
sound of one hand clapping a "sound." For some purposes it may
have meaning to do so, but these are purposes rooted in
metaphysics, not jurisprudence. If we cannot even venture an
educated guess as to what a person's rights are, those rights must
be, regrettably, irrelevant to any practical legal analysis.' As a legal
matter, then, any theoretically unknowable right could not be a legal
right at all. Questions answered by recourse to such rights would
only be addressable procedurally, and Dworkin is therefore correct
100. R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at 201; Sartorius, 11 GA. L. REV., supra note 3,
at 1269; Perry, Judicial Method and the Concept of Reasoning 80 ETHICS 1, 4, 19 n.10
(1969).
101. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 281; see D'Amato, Judicial Legislation, 1
CARDOZO L. REV. 63, 82-83 (1979).
102. I am using "educated guess" to mean a quite specific probabilistic assertion: A guess is "educated" if we are able to assert that the likelihood of its success is
somehow greater than the probability of success were we to select among the options
randomly. If there are two possibilities, a system of selection will be preferable to randomness if it yields the "right" answer more than fifty per cent of the time. If we cannot even venture an educated guess, we will be unable to distinguish our technique
from random selection on the basis of outcome.
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in relying upon a procedural justification for the rights thesis in
such a circumstance. But it would be wrong to claim that that
reliance is an argument in favor of the right answer hypothesis.
Cases answered in this way by the rights theF'- would have procedural answers, but they would still lack substantive certainty.
Dworkin addresses this "theoretical" argument by phrasing it
in a particular way.' 01 His version of the argument asserts that
whenever a right is inherently controversial it cannot meaningfully
be said to exist at all. This of course brings in the notion of "controversy," made still less clear by the qualifier "inherently," suggesting that not all controversy would support the theoretical argument. The sorts of controversy that Dworkin does not explore include precisely those circumstances in which I have suggested that
genuine uncertainty would necessarily yield controversy: incommensurable best theories and internal paradox within a single best
theory. Each of these will be inherently controversial in the sense
that controversy must arise when there is compelling reason to
decide in each of two opposing directions and no procedural
mechanism exists for selecting between the alternative necessary
decisions.
If we wish to understand how such a seemingly intolerable
situation might be permitted in a legal system, we need only look at
the truism that reasonable persons often differ about legal questions."0 ' This is what it means for a legal proposition to be controversial. We may even carve away the situations in which they will
differ because their conceptual tools are simply not very good;
where each is acting more like Herbert than Hercules. After all, in
that circumstance reasonable persons will agree that if they had access to better tools they would probably agree.
So the question remains, why else would reasonable persons
differ? Suppose that I say the capital of France is Paris, and you
claim that it is Hackensack. We will differ because you are wrong.
Our difference, however, is not reasonable. Perhaps we did not have
access to an authority that would demonstrate which of us was right
and which wrong; perhaps, that is, we had poor conceptual tools. We
103.
104.

R. DWORKIN, supra note 1. at 281.
The discussion which follows parallels in important ways that in N. MACCORMICK, supra note 37, at 246-49, 251-55. MacCormick uses a different nomenclature
and does not distinguish between paradox within a single theory and the incommensurability of competing theories. Nevertheless, he reaches the fundamental conclusion
that not all judicial questions may be even theoretically amenable to a single right
answer.
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have just agreed to eliminate this sort of artificial controversy from
consideration. If you continue to insist that the capital of France is
Hackensack, even after I show you an atlas or the appropriate
statute of French law, then even you would have to agree that you
are being unreasonable.
But there is a second, much more plausible, way in which we
may disagree. Suppose I say that Kansas City is the largest
metropolitan area in the state, while you claim it is not. Suppose further that I am speaking of the state of Kansas, while you are speaking of Missouri. The fact of the matter is that both of us are correct.
In a very real way, as reasonable persons without a technique for
selecting between two equally good underlying theories for what we
mean by "state," we will continue to disagree until we become exhausted.
So incommensurable best theories could lead to controversy.
Paradox within a single best theory would yield a similar dispute.
Suppose, for example, that we were in a legal system which treated
both property rights and the right to life as dispositive. Could a
slaveholder kill a slave? The system has a single explanatory theory,
but that theory includes potentially conflicting assumptions. The
conflict becomes real in the context of this problem, and no solution
is available.
Finally, controversy may, but need not, arise from tie decisions,
either between theories or within a single theory. Whether it does
so will depend upon the accuracy of our conceptual tools, and the existence of a procedural technique for allocating ties.0 5 Thus, these
cases would not present inherent controversy, although they do embody substantive uncertainty.
The theoretical argument from controversy, therefore, appears
to be an indirect and obscurantist way to approach the problem of
uncertainty. But, once phrased, what does Dworkin do with it? He
begins by referring to other disciplines in which controversial opinions are tolerated as the basis for statements of fact. In particular,
he alludes to history and science.'" But the kinds of conclusions that
controversial opinions may support are very different in these
relatively non-self-referential fields from what they are in the law. In
105. One such technique (which should be familiar to us) is simply requiring
that the finder of fact hold for one party or the other, at its discretion. R. DWORKIN,
supra note 1, at 286-87; text accompanying notes 144-46, infra.
106. R. DWORKIN. supra note 1, at 281-82.
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science there may be contingent conclusions; if the theory underlying them proves wrong, the conclusions may be revised."7 Thus, for
some time after Einstein proposed a revised model of the universe
based on his theory of relativity, that theory was not demonstrably
better than Newtonian physics. Whether one chose to believe Einstein or Newton was a matter about which reasonable scientists
could differ. As more data flowed in, however, it became clear that
Einstein's model was the better of the two. At that point reasonable
scientists could no longer differ, and the scientific community was
reunited by reason of a change in the conclusions drawn by a portion of its membership.
But legal questions can be very different. The law is
cybernetic, self-creative. When judges choose to adopt one controversial version of the best explanatory theory over another, their
acts are not totally contingent. They cannot go back if proven wrong
and undecide all their cases.0 8 What is more, their own choices will
have an impact on their own case and on future cases, subtly altering for all time the empirical legal behavior that a best explanatory
theory must seek somehow to fit. For this reason, the argument by
analogy to non-self-referential systems is deceptive and unhelpful."9
Dworkin next turns to a story. He asks us to imagine a legal
system in which judges may occasionally differ, but in which, when
they do, they "understand the arguments of their opponents sufficiently well enough to be able to locate the level of disagreement,
and to rank these arguments in rough order of plausibility."' 0 He introduces a professional skeptic into this society, a philosopher who
claims that the fact of their disagreement should be enough to
assure them that there can be no right answer to their disputes."'
107. See R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at 199. This constitutes at least part of
the difference between science and law.
108. Even Dworkin includes a limitation on the theory of mistake as part of
the rights thesis. R. DwoRuIN, supra note 1, at 122.
109. The argument in the text is too simplistic. Readers familiar with the Principle of Uncertainty in physics will argue that even in science the presence of an
observer has an impact on the observation which is both essential and impossible to
determine. Nevertheless, the role of self-reference in science is crucially different from
its role in the law. In the latter, the function of the experimenter (that is, the court)
may itself become the focus of inquiry in questions of jurisdiction and procedure. In
science it cannot. Dworkin seems to be aware of this, though that recognition has not
been reflected in his development of the rights thesis. See Dworkin, Social Science and
ConstitutionalRights, 61 EDUC. F. 271, 274 (1977).
110. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 283.
111. Id
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The philosopher, of course, is making a claim that is stronger than
necessary to demonstrate that there may be some cases without a
right answer. Dworkin implicitly relies on this fact when he
demonstrates that the philosopher must be wrong.
The success of Dworkin's demonstration is built into the society that he posits. For, if the judges may agree on a ranking of
their conflicting theories, then the only real disagreements will
come in the context of those propositions of law that are generally
perceived to be ties. The sort of general ranking that Dworkin
presupposes definitionally excludes incommensurable underlying
theories. Paradox within a single theory would be reduced to the far
simpler imagery of a tie decision by means of the ranking system.
This would create practical problems for the judges,"' but its
primary value here is to permit Dworkin to avoid having to discuss
internal paradox at all. His philosopher is left with a residue composed of ties. Dworkin then examines the nature of the tie
decision."'
In doing so he initially merges the two different sorts of tie
decision into one, claiming that a tie is precisely the same sort of
decision as one favoring one or the other of the parties. 14 This is
true of ties within a system, but it is not true for ties between competing best explanatory theories. Ties within the system represent
situations in which the judges will agree that the parties are at
equipoise. This is the same sort of decision that the judges might
reach if they were to agree that one party or the other had a right
to a decision. But it is a very different sort of decision from the one
that acknowledges that two explanatory theories are tied. The latter
takes place on a higher level of abstraction, and does not resemble
at all the usual balancing of opposing within-system arguments.
Merging the two into the within-system tie example, however, allows
Dworkin to ignore between-system ties. Furthermore, by asserting
that the tie decision is structurally identical to all other decisions he
can deny that it is any more inherently controversial than any other
decision." 5 This, of course, is so, though the nature of our tools may
make it more frequently behaviorally controversial."' But the fact
112. Paradox and equipoise are fundamentally distinct concepts. See text accompanying notes 56-57, supra; Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § III.
113. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 285-87.
114. Id. at 285.
115. Id
116. This is a claim that Sartorius has recently made. Sartorius, 11 GA. L. REV.,
supra note 3. To understand the derivation of that claim, which is both similar to and
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that all judges may agree to rank two arguments equally and
thereby view them as uncontroversially tied does not mean that
distinct from Dworkin's, we should look at the development of Sartorius' understanding of the nature of judicial uncertainty.
Initially, Sartorius seemed to feel that the question whether any case existed
for which there was no right answer would be impossible to evaluate in any conclusive
way. Sartorius, The Justification of the Judicial Decision 78 ETHICS 171, 185 (1968).
(As is suggested by the title of that essay, Sartorius has often been more interested in
the reasoning in which a judicial decision is couched than in the abstract question
whether that decision embodies the single correct answer.) He has come gradually to
concede (more and more explicitly) that there are cases without right answers. He first
hypothesized that such cases might exist. Sartorius, 8 AM. PHILOSOPHY Q., supra note
81, at 159. Most recently, he has accepted the fact that such cases actually do exist.
Sartorius, 11 GA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 1275.
Granting then, that the sort of uncertainty that I am arguing for exists in the
abstract, Sartorius has turned his attention to more practical concerns. First, he examines the issue of the sort of justification that might be expected. He concludes that
for all cases, right answer or no, judicial decisions should be expressed in the language
of rights. R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at 201-03. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at
286-87. I have no quarrel with this conclusion, and would tend to accept it myself. Text
accompanying notes 179-91, infra.
He acknowledges that the strongest argument against the right answer hypothesis
comes from the sort of source that I have identified. R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at
194. But he immediately turns away from that argument to the more expansive claim
that the right answer hypothesis must fail whenever no right answer is demonstrable.
That claim is a very broad one, identical to what I have called the no-right-answer
thesis (supra note 87), and Sartorius proceeds to reject it. R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3,
at 195. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 179-90. He also wishes to eliminate discretion,
arguing that not only is there a right answer in the vast majority of cases, but it will
be impossible to determine in which specific cases the right answer hypothesis will
fail. R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at 201.
If I read him correctly, he is saying that not all controversial cases will be without a
right answer, but that all cases without a right answer will be controversial. While I
agree with the first leg of this argument, I have rejected the second. See text accompanying notes 65-71, supra. The model that Sartorius seems to accept would suggest
an axis along which cases could be arrayed. Let us assume that cases in which a decision for the plaintiff is the right answer are to the right, cases in which a decision for
the defendant is the right answer are to the left, and cases without a right answer are
near the origin:
Ano

right
answer
FIGURE A

r

Let us assume further that we can delineate controversy as the fact that, in any given
case, our analytic tools are such that we cannot be certain that we have located the
point on the axis where the case actually lies, but, instead, can only be certain that we
have landed within a certain distance of that point. Thus, for a particular case in which
plaintiff has a right to win, our conceptual tools are such that we may be certain that
we will fall within the area marked on the axis, but uncertain that we will hit the actual point-
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they have eliminated uncertainty. If the arguments point in opposing directions, then the within-system tie decision remains a subcase x
A

no right '
answer
FIGURE B

Now that would not make any difference in the example depicted above, because all
points within the zone of controversy lie on the portion of the axis which denotes plaintiffs right to win. This case, then, would not be controversial. But suppose that there
were another case with the following mappingcase y
A

no right answer
FIGURE C

7r

Here some judges will believe that plaintiff has a right to win, others will believe that
there is no right answer, and still others will believe that defendant has a right to win.
In the abstract, plaintiff may still deserve to prevail, but the decision will be controversial. In this case it is quite clear that, at least if the margin of error surrounding the accurate point remains constant and as large as it is in Figure C, all no-right-answer
cases will be controversial. That is, any case that falls on the no-right-answer portion
of the axis will have a margin of error that includes some portion of the other portions
as well:
margin of error
A

no right answer
FIGURE D

This, of course, need not be the case. Instead, it might be that the margin of error is
so narrow (or the no-right-answer portion of the axis so large) that there will be some
non-controversial answerless cases:
margin of error
A

A

no right answer
FIGURE E

To make his point stick, then, Sartorius must show that this last version is never the
case and that Figure D is always a more accurate interpretation. Nothing in his book
proves this to be so.
Recently he has used Bayesian statistics to show that, even if some uncontroversial unanswerable cases exist, they will be exceedingly rare. His demonstration relies
on a faulty assumption, however, without which the same technique actually proves
the opposite of his conclusion. Sartorius, 11 GA. L. REV.. supra note 3. His claim relies
on the assumption that the criterion on which we will base the decision that there is a
high antecedent likelihood that a case has no right answer is itself independent from
judicial interpretation. That is, he suggests such criteria as "constitutional cases" and
"appellate cases" as the basis for predicting when a specific case will be without an
answer. Id. at 1271. But I would argue that the cases in which we are likeliest to find
no right answer are precisely those cases in which a reasonable judge using the rights
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stantively uncertain one. The between-system tie is more troublesome still.
Dworkin stresses the distinction between behavioral controversy (in which judges disagree because they cannot perceive the
underlying existing answers clearly enough) and a genuine tie decision (in which they can clearly perceive that the underlying existing
answer is within-system tie)."' He notes that it might be possible for
some legal systems to combine the two, but argues that they need
not do so and in practice tend not to do so."'
This argument is generally sound, highlighting again why it is
largely irrelevant to introduce the concept of controversy into a
discussion of uncertainty. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the example he chooses undermines his own argument: He presents a rule
from a hypothetical racetrack that defines a tie as any race in which
a photo finish yields a picture so blurred that the actual winner is
indistinguishable."9 This rule eliminates fallibility and controversy
over tie decisions. There may in fact be many legitimate tie decisions, even though better equipment might have identified a winner.
But, Dworkin claims, courtrooms are not racetracks, and we have no
reason to define our notion of a legal tie in such a way. Perhaps not,
but this particular argument hides a remarkably subtle series of
thesis concludes that there are incommensurable best theories underlying the law, or
that there is a tie between best theories, a tie within a best theory, or a contradiction
within such a theory. Text accompanying notes 185-87, infra. Obviously, these
determinations will not be independent of the judge's analysis of a particular case. In
fact, using Sartorius' symbols, the probability that any given case which meets my
criterion will be intractable, P(A), will be maximized. In the class of cases that meet
my criterion, the probability that the judge will correctly identify the case as an intractable case, P(B), will have to equal 1.0, for by my definition all cases meeting the
criterion will be ones that a reasonable judge would consider intractable. Following out
the mathematics to fill in the rest of Sartorius' formula is unnecessary. It amounts to a
demonstration of the point that the analogy to the axis of rights already made evident:
Whether or not it makes sense to claim, as Sartorius does, that it is highly unlikely
that unanswerable cases will ever be accurately identified will depend on a single
variable. On the axis, that variable was the ratio of the margin of error to the span of
the no-right-answer portion of the axis. In the statistical context it is simply the probability that a case determined by a reasonable judge to be unanswerable is, in fact,
unanswerable [P(A)]. And although this appears to be an empirical question, it concerns the measurement of relative quantities which are definitionally hidden from us.
In short, we may conjecture about whether such intractable cases are rare or frequent
(see e.g., text accompanying notes 165-78, infra), but we necessarily lack the equipment with which to measure directly their actual frequency.
117. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 285-86.
118. Id at 286.
119. Id
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non-sequitors which derive from the self-referential nature of the
law.
In reality, it is difficult to imagine accepting a rule such as the
proposes for the racetrack. We may accept the asserDworkin
one
tion that we can do no better, given our equipment, than to declare
the race a draw, but we would hardly accept the claim that because
of this the outcome actually became a tie. In a sense, unless we
change the meaning of the concept quite drastically, Dworkin is proposing a rather Orwellian racetrack: history is rewritten to accord
with the outcome we wish to espouse." This would make the race
self-referential, when in common experience it is not. The actual outcome of the race would be made contingent upon our judgment of
that outcome. But while this seems an odd rule to impose on racing,
it is quite a familiar rule in the law. The outcome is determined by
the judge (as it is in the race by the camera), even when that outcome may itself be shown eventually to have been a mistake.
Crucially, even after the mistake has been demonstrated, the
gravitational force of precedent will encourage us to rewrite history.
Future judges cannot merely dismiss the decision as mistaken; they
must reckon with its precedential force. 2' Over time, and as more
decisions come down, that force may actually change the content of
the law so that what once appeared to be a mistake is eventually
transmogrified into the right decision. Thus, Dworkin uses the
horseracing analogy for precisely the wrong reason. Our discomfort
with self-reference in athletics subtly segues into a claim that it is
novel and inappropriate in the law.

120. If you are a fan of both baseball and jurisprudence, you have probably
already considered the following question: Assume that the umpire calls a player out,
for example, at third base, but the videotape replay clearly demonstrates that the
third baseman didn't touch the ball until after the runner stepped on the bag. What is
the relation of the call to reality? We would probably agree that, even though he
violated no rule, the player is in fact "out." That is, we allow the umpire to define
"out" in close calls. But do we also accept that the runner was "tagged?" I would think
not We can watch the tape and see that he wasn't tagged at all, so even though we accept the outcome as the umpire defines it, we don't rewrite the experience of the game
to fit that outcome.
In the race it is a trickier question, since we use the word "tie" to define both
outcome and actual behavior. We would be better to name the outcome something like
"too close to call," to distinguish it from an actual "tie" between two horses. The
anomaly of Dworkins argument is made evident by this distinction: He seems to be
proposing a world in which we deem the horses to have "tied" whenever the race is
"too close to call." That world is, as I note, counterintuitive in the world of sports,
though it is not unrelated to the world of the law.
121. See, eg., R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 111, 120-23.
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Dworkin concludes with two arguments. First, he argues that
the tie decision is a rare and unlikely outcome for any complex legal
system."' This is a crucial claim which merits close scrutiny. But the
argument is spun into much finer thread in Dworkin's other essay, and
is best analyzed in that context. We need only recognize here that in
acknowledging the existence of the tie decision, Professor Dworkin
accepts uncertainty as part of the law. This essay should ultimately
be read as a repudiation of the no-right-answer thesis, rather than a
defense of the right answer hypothesis.
Finally, Dworkin turns to a claim that the no-right-answer
thesis might yet be an accurate representation of the law if the legal
system were viewed from an external perspective."' Since we agree
with Dworkin that the principle skeptic's arguments are without
merit, we need not pause to analyze the way in which he disposes of
them a second time. But no matter how many times Dworkin
responds to the no-right-answer claim, we cannot take those
arguments to count against the existence of uncertainty in the law.
"No

RIGHT ANSWER?"

This longer and considerably more interesting essay provides
no clearer statement of purpose than does the shorter one. Again,
we are never quite certain about the way in which Dworkin would
choose to define the no-right-answer thesis, but must somehow seek
to infer it from his arguments. These commence with the introduction of the notion of "dispositive concepts"-concepts that must by
definition be either true or false, and for which the absence of truth
implies the necessity of falsity.2 4 Dworkin suggests that many legal
concepts are of this sort. That is, they are not opposites, like "full"
125
and "empty," but complements, like "full" and "less than full.
The things that Dworkin terms dispositive legal concepts are
things like our common law notions of "liability," "crime,"
"contract," and so on. Dworkin, then, is suggesting that someone is
either liable or not, either criminal or not, that a document is either
a contract or it isn't. 2 ' So far, this seems reasonable enough. But implicit in this claim is an argument that these are, first, matters of
right (so that if the plaintiff does not have a right that the defen122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id at 286-87.
Id at 287-89.
Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 2.
Id
Id
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dant be held liable, the defendant has the explicit right to be held
not liable), and, second, by extension, that they are the specific propositions that a court must decide. Thus, Professor Dworkin wants us
to accept that courts are in the business of deciding whether or not
a dispositive concept holds, in every case brought before them.
Still, this is reasonable enough. We should, however, recognize
two things: First, the notion of dispositive concepts is a notion that
ignores self-reference. It assumes that there is an objective reality
that requires that something either is or is not a contract. There are
no contingent possibilities allowed by the concept, possibilities such
as the claim that a document is a contract if, and only if, a court
decides that it is. Second, the notion collapses what must be a twostage decision-making process into a single-staged one. It is the
responsibility of the finder of fact ultimately to decide whether or
not the defendant is liable. But initially the finder of law must
decide what "liability" itself is to mean in this case. While there are
only two outcomes, there are an infinite number of potential definitions of liability, and which of these we choose will depend on the
settled law and the best explanatory theory.
Having created the notion of dispositive concepts in the law
Professor Dworkin proceeds to categorize the claims he wishes to
criticize into two distinct heaps. There are those claims that argue
that Dworkin has excluded some middle value, and those claims that
argue that bivalence-the either/or requirement inherent in logical
complements-must necessarily break down." It is not difficult to
allocate the sources of uncertainty in the law to these two heaps.
Cases for which no answer exists because there is a tie between two
competing best theories or between the arguments put forth by the
parties present an excluded third category of case-the tie decision.
Thus, we would argue under this theory that there will be cases in
which the defendant is neither liable nor not liable, but in which, instead, the case for liability is equally balanced against the case for
its lack.
By contrast, cases that manifest internal contradiction, either
between incommensurable best theories or within a single such
theory, are definitional examples of the failure of bivalence. When
Dworkin describes the failure of bivalence, however, he does so in
127. Id at 3-5. Of course, all examples of an excluded middle are also examples
of a failure (or actually a nonexistence) of bivalence. The point is that the excluded
middle is a very special form of lack of bivalence- when there is a middle category we
don't even expect bivalence to succeed. Similarly, whenever bivalence fails there must
be some excluded third category into which those cases fall- an excluded middle.
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an unusual way. Bivalence is usually said to fail when it is possible
to demonstrate that there are two statements which are simultaneously true in spite of the fact that they contradict one another.
Bivalence fails when both (p) and (-p) are true. Dworkin suggests,
however, that bivalence fails when neither (p) nor (-p) is true."8
Logically, these definitions are equivalent. But, conveniently for
Dworkin's argument, the latter version makes it easier to ignore the
otherwise evident example of paradox.
Dworkin typifies the first heap of arguments as "semantic."'"
That is, they are claims about the meaning of legal concepts, and
should be supported by the ways in which those concepts are
typically used.'
He then notes that we never speak of the
hypothesized excluded middle category.' Someone is either liable
or not liable; no one is "sort of liable" or "almost liable." Something
is criminal or not criminal, nothing is "criminous." And this is true.
We should recognize that the outcomes of judicial decisions are, for
all practical purposes, bivalent. It would even be hard to conceive of
what we would do to persons whom we found to be criminous. Perhaps we would put them in prison but also give them the key.
And yet, from the judge's perspective, outcome is only half,
and far from the most important half, of the decision-making process. Indeed, usually outcome is determined by juries, and not by
judges. The major responsibility that judges have is to answer the
initial questions about what we mean by our various dispositive
legal concepts. That decision, the definition of "criminal" or "liable,"
is not a binary one. Because it is not binary, it is never spoken of in
binary terms. Instead, lawyers urge various different definitions on
judges, arguing quite commonly for any of several alternatives.
Competing definitions are supported by competing "best" theories,
and ties between competing best theories yield competing alternatives. This is a fact that is internal to the process of judging, but
it is nonetheless a fact.'
128.
NEWMAN,

Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv.. supra note 1, at 4-5. See E. NAGEL & J.
GODEL'S PROOF 14 (1958).

129. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 1, at 6.
130. Id
131. Id
132. Judges speaking of their work often do use language that makes evident
their concern with multivalent choices in the definition of common law. This language,
not the arguments of lawyers alleging their clients' purported rights to opposing outcomes, is what we should investigate in evaluating the "semantic" argument. And
when we do so we find that argument upheld. See B.N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-31 (1921).
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3
Dworkin acknowledges the possibility of this sort of tie. In
"Can Rights Be Controversial?" he addressed the within-theory
tie.' Here, he drops all reference to that sort of uncertainty, and
addresses the claim for the between-theory tie just described. Oddly, however, he attributes these ties to the other heap, claiming that
135
they are arguments against bivalence. Clearly, they are not, or, if
they are, they are so only in the sense that all arguments in favor of
an excluded middle will argue against the bivalence of the two initial concepts.136 This heap juggling is made plausible in part by the
way in which Dworkin defined the failure of bivalence. Just as the
simultaneous truth of opposing propositions suggests paradox, the
37
simultaneous failure of those propositions suggests a tie." But ties
are a separate middle category, and represent a necessary source of
uncertainty from Dworkin's first heap, not his second one, if the
distinction between the heaps is to have any meaning at all.

Having recognized this, it is most convenient to return to the
argument when Dworkin does. The argument in favor of withinsystem ties, however, finds no home at all in Dworkin's essay, even
though such ties clearly may exist. And if they exist they will have
to be dealt with, either by creating a middle category of outcomes
or by allocating the tie decisions to one side or the other. The
former is plainly impossible so long as outcomes are ruthlessly
dichotomous. If someone is either liable or not, there can be no middle ground. But the fact that we neither have nor speak of a middle
ground in these cases is merely mute testimony to the fact that we
have chosen the other alternative-we have allocated tie decisions
133. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. supra note 1, at 30-31; See R. DWORKIN. supra
note 1, at 285-87.
134. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 285.
135. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 30-31.
136. See note 127, supra.
137. Two propositions:
A >B
A <B
If both are true, we have a paradox. But if both are false, a third proposition may be
true:
A= B
While this follows from the fact that equality was an excluded middle possibility in the
first pair, it accurately captures the intuitive sense that mutually incorrect opposing
statements imply a tie. For a brief discussion of paradox in the law arising from each
litigant possessing an opposing right, see N. MACCORMICK, supra note 37, at 256-57.
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to one side or the other, generally as the finder of fact sees fit. Once
the judge has defined the concept, we do not allow the jury to claim
that the facts don't quite fall on either side of the line of demarcation but fall instead precisely on that line. We tend to leave the
choice of which side to place it on to their discretion, guided solely
by vague instructions about which side must carry the burden of
persuasion and to what degree.'"
Thus, Dworkin's argument against the first heap, the "semantic" heap, fails because, at the relevant level of discourse-the one
relating to questions of law, rather than the ultimate bivalent question of fact-we do use language that suggests a multivalent
decision-making process. Indeed, the version of the semantic argument that I have put forward expects the verbal behavior of
lawyers advocating conflicting outcomes to appear dichotomous. 39' It
suggests, however, that we should not be surprised if outside the
courtroom-in discussions among judges, in conversations between
attorneys and clients, and in colloquy on the pages of scholarly journals-questions of law are treated as multivalent. I would simply
note that such behavior comports well with our common experience.
In turning to the second heap of claims, we should note at the
outset that Dworkin never even addresses the single claim that best
exemplifies the failure of bivalence-the claim of internal paradox.
Instead, he directs his attention to three other versions: the argument from vagueness, "' the argument from positivism,' and the
argument from controversy (remember controversy?). " '
The argument from vagueness is the claim that the concepts
used in the law are inherently vague. They are like the idea of
138. Of course, lawyers generally speak of a right to a particular outcome.
They are, after all, advocates for their clients' claims. See note 129, supra; Greenawalt,
75 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 383, 385; Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial
Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 1038 (1977). The mechanics of how we use burden of
proof as an outcome allocation mechanism for disputed questions of fact is discussed
admirably by Glanville Williams. Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, 1979 CRIM. L.
REV. 297, 303.
139. The fact that there is always a procedural right to some outcome also
leads to the semantic practice of claiming a right to a particular outcome. Perry, Contested Concepts and Hard Cases, 88 ETHICS 20, 34-35 (1977); Greenawalt, 75 COLUM. L.
REV., supra note 4, at 385. Even this, however, is limited to their behavior in litigation.
As counselors and negotiators they may speak very differently. See D'Amato, 1 CARDozo L. REV., supra note 101, at 72-73.
140. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 12-16.
141. Id at 16-23.
142. Id at 23-32.
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"middle-aged" or "heap," impossible to define precisely."' This argument is a veiled form of the uncertainty deriving from competing
best theories. As Dworkin notes, legal theories include rules and
principles of statutory interpretation. 1 " In addition the rights thesis
presents a model for the way in which judges are to go about
answering the questions of definition that are posed to them as part
of their responsibilities. It is only when that system fails to yield a
single best explanatory theory that we can meaningfully speak of a
vague term in the law. It is only then that competing best theories
will offer competing best definitions.
Professor Dworkin suggests that his rights thesis is a way to
eliminate uncertainty.1"5 With the exception of the uncertainty just
described, there is considerable truth to that claim. But with respect
to the uncertainty that derives from competing best theories, his
thesis serves to draw our attention to, rather than eliminate, indeterminacy in the law."4' What, then, are we to do? As already discussed, such cases may either be treated as a separate category,
thus creating an excluded middle, or they may be allocated to one or
the other of the existing sides. 47
Dworkin's solution, and the only one he offers to supplement
the rights thesis, is to allocate all ties to the defendant,"8 which
amounts to an irrational preference for the status quo.149 This is
precisely where we must recall the distinction between discretion
and uncertainty. Perhaps a policy argument can be made that the
allocation of ties to the defendant is preferable to granting judges
permission to follow their fancy. But these arguments speak only to
143. I. at 12. Inherent in Dworkin's description of this argument is a rejection
of Friedrich Waismann's claim that open texture, or, as he puts it, the "possibility of
vagueness" in definition is impossible to avoid. Waismann, supra note 13, at 126.
144. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 12-16.
145. Id. at 12-13; but see Dworkin, supra note 49, at 153-54.
146. "[T]he question is not whether these items are ambiguous or vague, but
whether their ambiguity contributes to the paradoxes, so that removing a bit of
vagueness, clearing up an ambiguity, will destroy enough of the argument within the
paradox to remove the resulting contradiction." J. MACKIE, TRUTH, PROBABILITY, AND
PARADOX 246 (1973). Dworkin's concentration on controversy rather than uncertainty
allows him to parlay a procedural claim from the rights thesis- that judges should rely
on the canons of statutory construction- into a substantive claim favoring the right
answer hypothesis- that, after all vagueness is removed, no uncertainty will ever remain. It's a nice trick.
147. Since judges must always decide, however, a separate category is rather
implausible. Perry, 88 ETHICS, supra note 139, at 31; J. MACKIE, supra note 146, at 267.
148. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV.. supra note 1, at 12-13.
149. See Steinberg, The Voter's ParadoxRegained, 83.ETHICS 163, 166 (1973).'
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the folly of judicial discretion, not the absence of substantive uncertainty. These cases must ultimately be decided arbitrarily, another
way of saying that they are without any right answer.
Dworkin next turns to the "argument from positivism."'" This
is a critical turning point in the essay, for it is here that Dworkin
moves from defending the right answer hypothesis to decrying the
no-right-answer thesis. He switches from trying to show that there
will always be a subtantively certain outcome to the more defensible
claim that there will be right answers on at least some of the occasions when the law would appear to be uncertain.
He rejects a variety of different arguments from a variety of
different breeds of positivism. His method of doing so is strict
logical deduction, a method he normally eschews. Used in the context of eliminating arguments about paradox by rejecting any claim
allowing contradiction, this sort of approach exhibits a striking circularity of reasoning.
Dworkin argues against semantic positivism as follows: All
forms of positivism require that propositions of law are true if, and
only if, someone or something acts in such a way as to make them
true. If we symbolize the proposition of law as (p), then the positing
act may be symbolized as L(p). Semantic positivism argues that L(p)
means precisely the same thing that (p) means. Dworkin argues that:
If a particular form of semantic positivism supplies the
value of 'L' such that L(p) and L(-p) cannot both be false,
then the argument for the second version of the [claim
that there is no right answer] does not, for this form of
positivism, go through. But if it supplies some value for
L' such that L(p) and L(-p) may both be false (as the command form of semantic positivism does) then it contradicts
itself because, since (p) and (-p) cannot both be false, it cannot be that (p) means the same as L(p) and (-p) means the
''5
same as L-p). 1 1
What a marvelous argument! Dworkin rejects semantic
positivism because it manifests precisely the characteristic that he
is examining it to find. Of course, if we reject all theories of law that
permit internal paradox, we will find to our surprise that the
systems that are left will be devoid of that noxious characteristic,"'2
Unfortunately, they would also be very unrealistic.
150.
151.
152.

Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 16-23.
Id at 17; see also J. Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 59-61 (1979).
See J. MACKIE, supra note 146, at 256.
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Take, for example, the command form of positivism that
Dworkin repudiates. We must surely admit that if there is a
sovereign, and if the law is whatever the sovereign says it is, then
the law will be contradictory whenever the sovereign capriciously so
desires. If we eliminate all theories of law that permit such inconsistency, our sovereign's declarations will never be legal. This is an
argument that will be difficult to explain to the person sitting in jail
for violating one of the sovereign's conflicting demands."
We can hardly complain that we have developed a theory that
deprives such willful monarchs of the mantle of legitimacy. But,
since internal contradiction is a potential aspect of all practical legal
systems, we will also have eliminated any plausible theory of law.
The fact of the matter is that paradox exists.'54 Arguments based on
the assumption that it does not are not merely fallacious empirically,
they are wholly without force when used to demonstrate the
premise on which they are founded.
Similar claims can be made about all of Dworkin's "refutations"
of the arguments from positivism. Towards the end of this section,
however, he introduces an extended metaphor on which he bases the
remainder of the essay. This is the metaphor of "narrative consistency," a concept he introduces as an aspect of literary
criticism.'55 As the essay continues, he suggests a series of general
theories of critical judgment that look increasingly like analogues of
his own rights thesis.
These analogues ask us to imagine a group of literary critics
discussing David Copperfield. Some facts about the character David
will be clear in the book. Others will be uncertain. Professor
Dworkin suggests that the uncertain facts may be subject to
arguments of narrative consistency. That is, even though it is not
clear whether David had a homosexual affair with Steerforth, different critics might point to different facts from within the book to
argue that the book, taken as a whole, more strongly suggests that
such an affair did happen than that it did not.15 From this analogy,

153. Although Dworkin would reject Hart's version of positivism because it
permits contradiction, he need not go to the effort of demonstrating that it does so by
means of pure logic. Hart concedes as much. Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of
Law, supra note 48, at 184.
154. See Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § I B.
155. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 19-22.
156. Id at 22-29.
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Dworkin draws the claim that we must "reject the idea that there is
no right answer whenever the right answer is not demonstrable ...."157
This conclusion strikes me as unobjectionable enough, but the
manner of getting there is a bit treacherous. First, this is another
use of a non-self-referent metaphor for the self-referential judicial
process. In Dworkin's literary game the players are all critics. Let
us suppose the other extreme possibility: They are not critics but
Dickens himself. The first thing we would have to acknowledge is
that, at least before the book is sent off to the printers, narrative
consistency is not worth a damn to Dickens."'8 David did whatever
Dickens pleased him to have done. If Dickens says that David had a
homosexual affair, we will be forced to agree. If Dickens wished to
turn David into a duck, he could. And if Dickens wanted to say on
page 12 that David had type-A blood, and on page 25 that his blood
was type-O, we readers would be stuck with having to deal with the
contradiction.'" 9
If we relax the requirements a bit and posit a version
somewhat closer to the reality of our legal system, let us suppose
that our players are all collaborators on the book that they are
criticizing. Though they do not always agree among themselves as to
what their words imply, they are all forced to accept even those portions not written by themselves. Their opinion about narrative consistency will have a more complex relation to what we may actually
draw from their book than would the opinions of a separate group of
literary critics. And, within the sections written by each individually,
that individual will have something of a stranglehold on its appropriate interpretation.'
From all this we may draw a number of conclusions. First,
authors, even partial authors, do not have the responsibility to produce a coherent interpretation in the way that critics do. Second,
once internal inconsistency is introduced, no critic will be able to ex157. Id at 29.
158. The question is less clear after the book is out of the author's hands.
While we might wish to defer to the author's interpretation even at this stage, it is
defensible to claim that once the manuscript leaves the author's hands the author
becomes just another literary critic.
159. Some authors seem to revel in this sort of manipulation. Joyce and
Beckett are notorious examples. See also Munzer, Right Answer&Preexisting Rights,
and Fairness, 11 GA. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1977). Command positivism, as just described,
would yield a similar difficulty.
160. This assertion is similarly subject to the reservation expressed in note
158, supra.
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plain it away. And, finally, the conclusion that Dworkin would draw
from his metaphor- that there is sometimes a right answer even
though the facts are controversial- is not connected, even here, to a
claim that uncertainty is not an important element of the law. There
may, that is, be times, in every legal system, when the right answer
is not demonstrable either simply because our technique is inductive
rather than deductive, or, more likely, because no such answer exists.
With this understanding of narrative consistency, we may turn
to Dworkin's description of the argument from controversy. In a
sense, this portion of "No Right Answer?" echoes the arguments
presented in the shorter essay."6 '
Once again, he concludes by conceding the technical possibility
of a tie decision. He returns to the possibility that two best theories
might imply opposing arguments.'6 2 Actually, what he suggests is
that there are analogues to the literary game's possibility that there
will be some questions for which the critics, try as they may, can
make no arguments at all, not even arguments of narrative consistency."e As an example, he suggests the question whether David
had a particular blood-type.16
Somehow he makes the leap from this literary example to the
possibility of a tie between potential best political theories. The leap
is an odd one, since the direct possibility of silence within a legal
system seems at least worthy of discussion. Nowhere else is
Dworkin so demanding of his concept of an underlying set of legal
principles. This jump, however, suggests that all acceptable legal
theories must be perfectly substantively certain. That is, they must
include some answer, win, lose, or draw, for every case that might
be brought within the political system. If that were not the case, it
would be possible for a theory to be simply silent. Then silence and
not a tie between conflicting theories would be the logical analogue
to the example of David's blood type.
But Dworkin does not follow that path, choosing instead to examine between-theory ties. As I have already noted, these would
161.

Compare Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 23-32, with R.

DWORKIN. supra note 1, at 279-90.

162. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 30-31.
163. Id at 29-30.
164. Id at 29. This kind of question is an example of the special version of internal tie that results from internal silence. It is like the property allocation questions
discussed in Richards, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 2, at 1314-15.
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have seemed more appropriate to the earlier discussion of the excluded middle version of the argument, but it is developed here instead, as an example of the failure of bivalence.
And it is here that Dworkin seeks to evaluate how common it
will be to find a tie between best theories. He proposes two dimensions along which we may evaluate theories to see just how good
they are. One is goodness of fit, the other is political morality. '
Oddly, he embraces here a version of goodness of fit that he has rejected elsewhere 6'- the strict notion that a theory is better "if
someone who held the theory would, in its service, enact more of
what is settled than would someone who held the other."' Since I
have just argued that it would be futile to demand consistency
within the work of an author who wished to be inconsistent,
however, I suppose that I have waived my right to cavil.
Dworkin then suggests that in a complex, highly developed,
modern legal system it will be very rare to find such a tie with
respect to the goodness of fit of competing theories.'68 This seems to
make intuitive sense since there will be an almost infinite number of
69
legal events for which a system would have to account."
But reality
in this case may well be counter-intuitive.
Suppose that there is some specific legal system that is at a
very primitive level of development. There may be several, indeed
many, parallel theories that might, in a particular hard case, suggest
conflicting determinations. As each successive legal behavior is
added to our primitive legal universe, making it thereby more complex and sophisticated, each of these parallel theories may be
modified to take the new observations into account. There is no
theoretical reason why we should not be able to make the modifications by adjusting the balance of some principles or by adding new
165. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 30-31.
166. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 360-61.
167. Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 1, at 30.
168. Id at 30-31. This is precisely the response that Bernard Williams predicts
will be engendered by certain sorts of paradox. B. WILLIAMS. PROBLEMS OF THE SELF
200 (1973). It is also the claim that Dworkin makes with respect to ties within a single
best explanatory theory (ties which are, from the judges' perspective, decisions
precisely like decisions favoring one side or the other). R. DwORKIN. supra note 1, at
285-87.
169. While there is some intuitive appeal to Dworkin's perception, others have
suggested precisely the opposite. See e., Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV., supra note 48, at
629; Merrills, Book Review (R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously), 29 U. OF TORONTO
L.J. 74, 75 (1979Y; Munzer, 11 GA. L. REV., supra note 159, at 1058-59.
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ones. When we get done, the altered theory will explain the new
observations as well as the old. If this can be done, then, as the legal
system becomes more complex, there is no concomitant diminution
in the number of available theories that adequately explain the
system. And, at any point in the development of the system, a case
may be introduced that will cause the theories, which agree perfectly on their descriptions of the past, to require divergent outcomes
with respect to the present.
This sort of model is common in other disciplines. As more data
was observed about the functioning of the solar system, for example, the Ptolemaic system had to be modified to take into account
observations it would otherwise not have predicted. At some point
the relative simplicity of the Copernican theory became compelling.
But that relative simplicity does not mean that an earth-centered
solar system is incorrect, although it might be very complex to
describe mathematically. In fact, any point in the solar system could
be taken arbitrarily as the center and a theory developed based on
that assumption. There are, thus, an infinite number of possible explanatory theories for the arrangement of the solar system, theories
whose number does not decrease as the observed data about the
system increases.
Similarly, the complexity of legal behavior need not lead us to
believe that the number of political theories that might explain the
behavior is dwindling. Such a contention would be acceptable only if
we were to adopt, as one of our assumptions, a value of simplicityOccam's razor. 70 But such an assumption ignores self-reference. It
may be valid on the level of the grossly observable physical
sciences, but it loses any appeal in any system that will be affected
by the choice itself." ' We may pick Copernicus over Ptolemy
because we know that if future observations make the Ptolemaic
system more attractive we can always swap back. But a choice of
one political theory over another is more of a one-way street.72 Once

170. Dworkin does intimate, in the context of a discussion of political theories,
that some modified version of Occam's razor may be applicable. Dworkin, Liberalism
supra note 18, at 121. See also Munzer, 11 GA. L. REV.. supra note 159, at 1057.
171. See R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at 199; Kennedy, Legal Formality 2 J. OF
LEGAL STUD. 351, at
56-57 (1973).
172. Gallie, supra note 68, at 179. This line of argument, which seems to be accepted by Sartorius in R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at 199, contradicts Dworkin's scarcity hypothesis and Sartorius' identification of jurisprudential reasoning with that of
physics. Id at 185.
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chosen, the choice itself will make it harder to reject the theory in
the future.17
And although Dworkin does not here discuss the scarcity claim
with respect to ties within a theory, an analogous argument will
hold there as well.'74 The chances that the scales will be perfectly
balanced about any point of law in any complex legal system are infinitesimal. The constitutive principles are presumably complex and
highly interrelated in such a system; reaching perfect balance would
be like picking out a single point on a number line that has an infinite number from which to select. But that need not be the case,
precisely because the principles do not develop in isolation but
rather become defined by reference to one another. ' So it may well
be that each principle brings with it, as it springs into being, some
equal and opposite principle that precisely counterbalances it in at
least some circumstances. Thus, when we view an internal conflict,
between, say, property rights and civil rights,'6 or between the
guarantee of a free press and that of a fair trial,' it is by no means
a foregone conclusion that equipoise is a virtually impossible end
result.
We should not hasten to embrace Dworkin's scarcity claim,
then, at least without a careful consideration of the second dimension that he suggests is necessary for the evaluation of competing
best theories- political morality. Does this dimension make ties
substantially less likely? Perhaps, but then again perhaps not. The
answer to that question will depend on precisely what Dworkin
means by political morality, and how that concept is to be used in
the specific context of evaluating possible political theories. The fact
that he has thus far failed to provide such explanations is not just a
shortcoming in the argument favoring the right answer hypothesis,
it is a significant hole in the rights thesis itself.'8
173. Notions such as elegance or simplicity are irrelevant to many sorts of
judgments about competing bests. For example, the economic model discussed in the text
accompanying notes 53-55, supra, cannot appeal to simplicity as a basis for selecting
among points on an indifference curve. See also Perry, 80 ETHICS, supra note 100, at 15.
174. Because he focuses on different sorts of tie in the two different essays,
without explicitly distinguishing the two, the essays may appear to be somewhat contradictory. Compare Dworkin, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV.. supra note 1, at 30, with R. DWORKIN,
supra note 1, at 340-41.
175. We may view the balancing of principles as a continuous series of trade-offs,
yielding a continually infinite set of equibalanced points. This is precisely the nature of
economic judgments between commodities. See text accompanying notes 53-56, supra.
176. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
177. See, e.g , Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
178. Richards, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV.. supra note 2, at 1298-1302.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1980], Art. 1
420

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

Where, then, do we find ourselves at the conclusion of the second of these two attempts to evaluate the right answer hypothesis?
Professor Dworkin has adeptly put to rest the no-right-answer
thesis, but that had never been strongly articulated in the first
place. He has never addressed the most important of the sources of
uncertainty in the law- internal inconsistency within a single theory
of law. Elsewhere he has simply rejected the analogous conflict between theories, the possibility of incommensurability.'79 He has
acknowledged in these two essays both the possibility that the best
available explanatory theory will itself yield tie decisions, and the
possibility that there will be two or more possible explanatory
theories that will be tied according to his definition of what constitutes a "best" theory. He has asserted, without demonstrating,
that each of these will be very rare. For my part, I have suggested
that that assertion-which bridges the gap between the relatively
weak claims that Dworkin succeeds in demonstrating and the much
stronger right answer hypothesis that he seems to want to support-cannot sustain intense scrutiny.
At the outset, I suggested that the failure of the right answer
hypothesis did not threaten the fundamental soundness to the rights
thesis. How can that be? The rights thesis will not provide an outcome for every possible case. Indeed, it will not even supply us with
a procedure for reaching such an outcome. Does it nevertheless retain the kind of explanatory and normative force that Dworkin
claims for it? Or is it, like Hart's positivism, fatally weakened by its
failure to tell us how to decide intractable cases?
CONCLUSION: THE RIGHTS THESIS REDIVIVUS

Dworkin's rights thesis, stripped of any version of the right
answer hypothesis, amounts to the proposal that judges, faced with
a decision for which there is no settled answer in the existing law,
must continue to search for a solution. The law is not exhausted by
a list of settled rules. Rather, those rules may be seen as data, effects pointing in the direction of their cause. Underlying the rules of
a legal system there must be a political theory that justifies them.
And that theory must provide answers to many of the problems that
the rules themselves leave unsolved. To the best of his or her ability
to discern, the judge faced with a difficult case must determine
whether that case is intractable.
179.

R. DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 359-63.
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In order to do so judges must continually construct explanatory
theories, based on the data provided by the constantly changing
system of rules. And, since many theories may be possible, judges
should have some criterion whereby they select among those
possibilities. They are to choose the best theory, the theory that
best accounts for all the data and that best fits the applicable
political morality.
There are difficulties in any adaptation of this theory to practice, difficulties that I have mentioned in passing and others have
discussed in detail. In particular, it remains to be seen whether
Dworkin can establish an adequate explanation of how judges are to
select a single best theory. 8 ' But the rights thesis also has many virtues. On an important intuitive level it seems likely that there will
be some cases for which recourse to rights and principles will yield
widely acceptable decisions. For these cases, the rights thesis provides an answer (and a justification) where none had existed before.
But the thesis presents a much more compelling reason for its
own adoption. Rights are trumps, they are reasons for their own enforcement. Where a political right exists, nothing less than a right
will justify a political process that does not enforce it. Thus,
wherever we may believe that we will unearth rights we must, if we
are to act responsibly, adopt that mechanism most likely to discern
and enforce them.18' If it could, therefore, be said that there will
always exist a right to a particular decision in every conceivable
case, we would be phrasing implicitly a very strong argument in
favor of the rights thesis. That is, if rights were always involved in
litigation, judges would by definition be required to seek out those
rights and apply them dispositively in their decision-making process.
But two objections may be raised immediately. The first is the
one that I have made here at length- not all cases may be decided
by recourse to an investigation of the parties' rights. Some cases
will not be just difficult, they will be genuinely and irretrievably intractable. The second objection is that the rights thesis may not be
the best way of ascertaining the rights of the parties involved. The
rights thesis qua normative theory suggests that where rights exist
judges must unearth them. But the claim of the rights thesis qua
descriptive theory must rely on the ability of Professor Dworkin's
practical model to respond to the demands of his theoretical one.
180. Richards, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 2, at 1298-1302; Mackie, 7
PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFF., supra note 56, at 3.
181. It is this insight that leads Sartorius to seek a rights-based justification in all
cases. Sartorius, 11 GA. L. REV.. supra note 3, at 1270, 1273.
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The first of these objections is fuel for the fire of the second. If
the rights thesis provides no basis for determining the rights of the
parties in some particular cases, then perhaps some other, more
complex or complete, theory does. In short, granted that we must
enforce whichever rights can be determined to exist, why do it in
this way? This is a practical question, and the response must be
phrased in practical terms.
There are important conceptual ties between the idea of having
a right and the reflective process that Dworkin recommends to
judges for the determination of the parties' rights to particular outcomes. If rights are at all susceptible to human contemplation,
Dworkin's procedure (subject to further clarification and delineation)
will be likely to root them out. And if they are not, then how can we
meaningfully claim that such rights exist at all? Thus, if rights may
be found by having people look for them, and if they are linked to
existing political structures in the way Dworkin supposes- that is, if
there are such things as Dworkin's "institutional rights"-then the
only way we will be able to identify them is to ponder the facts,
ponder the political system, and ponder the theory that these must
embody.
But perhaps rights may not be identified, or at least not identified any better by this system than they would be by some sort of
random selection process. I have suggested that a totally
unknowable right is an oxymoron, a concept we must reject by
reason of its internal contradiction."' We may have unknowable
responsibilities, such as those imposed by a silent and demanding
god, but how can we have totally unknowable rights, at least
unknowable rights against an existing political system? If such
rights exist, and we almost universally believe them to be part of
the contemporary human condition, then they must in some way be
linked to the kind of reflection required by the rights thesis.
We cannot prove that rights exist by recourse to this sort of
argument, but we can demonstrate that if they do exist, even if we
only concede that they may exist, we will be obliged to adopt the
structural mechanism most likely to find them out. And if we can
never be certain that, in any given case, our mechanism has not in
fact unearthed a right to a particular decision, so long as that is the
best available mechanism we will be bound to enforce its determina182.

See text accompanying notes 100-03, supra.
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tions.183 Thus, there may be substantial surface differences among
legal systems and the specific rights they locate and enforce. But so
long as we acknowledge the possibility that there are any institutional rights at all, all legal systems will reflect a certain core
similarity in the way they go about searching for those rights. And,
by our definition of what it means to possess a right, any mechanism
that does not seek and enforce rights will be susceptible to fundamental criticism.
Thus, wherever we suspect that rights may exist we will
necessarily look towards the rights thesis for insight. There will, of
course, be controversial cases. But Dworkin has demonstrated that
the existence of controversy, taken alone, is not sufficient to
disprove the existence of rights even in these cases."' We may make
the claim that there is a better way to determine rights in controversial cases than by allowing a single idiosyncratic judge to
decide their outcome. We might seek the agreement of a larger
group, or we might identify some individual whose judgment we
particularly trust and allow him or her to make the final decision. In
effect, our system of appellate courts reflects a combination of these
two concerns. But neither is a claim against the rights thesis; each is
merely a proposed model for improving its effectiveness in practice.
The rights thesis, then, is important whenever we believe that
an institutional right might be dispositive of a dispute, not only
when we antecedently know that it must be. 8' But what of the
various sources of essential, uncertainty that I have outlined? In
these cases we know that the rights thesis will be of no help. We
know that they will elude solution even after we have searched for
the parties' respective rights. What justification do we have for applying the rights thesis to Dred Scott's or Allan Bakke's case? Can
we isolate these cases in some way, can we, that is, improve the
reliability of the application of the rights thesis by removing these
sorts of cases from its application?

183. Perry, 88 ETHICS. supra note 139, at 35. We may, and perhaps should,
therefore act as if the rights thesis were always capable of providing a right answer. See
MacIntyre, The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1, 2 (1973);
see also Richards, 1 CARDOZO L. REV., supra note 28, at 204-05.
184. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 279-81.
185. This is the conclusion that Sartorius reaches. R. SARTORIUS, supra note 3, at
202; Sartorius, 8 AM. PHILOSOPHY Q., supra note 81, at 159. As far as it goes, it is unobjectionable. Difficulty is encountered only when he seeks to leap from this claim to the claim
that, in practice, cases without right answers will be too infrequent and too difficult to
discern to make them worthy of judicial consideration. See note 116 supra.
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It would be tempting to believe that we could do so, that we
could identify some hallmark of uncertainty, snare these intractable
cases, and remove them from the jurisdiction of our standard
decision-making mechanism. The Sirens' song of that endeavor is
tempting, but it emanates from a deceptive assumption. The model
of the rights thesis that I have outlined here suggests that rights
are inseparable from our ability to discern them by application of
the sort of inductive reflection that Professor Dworkin advocates
(which is not the same as an ability to demonstrate their existence).
Rolf Sartorius has shown statistically how unlikely it would be for
us to be able to identify intractable cases by means of some variable
independent of judicial reasoning. 6' Dworkin's and Sartorius' work
suggest why this should be so in theory. It is precisely the reflective
process of the rights thesis that leads not only to right answers
when they exist, but to the most reliable determination that any
particular case is in fact intractable.
Thus, it is inappropriate to ask how the rights thesis may be
applied to intractable cases, or to denigrate it for failing to provide
solutions to these judicial dilemmas. It is precisely a value of the
rights thesis, perhaps even its most important attribute, that it provides a way to spotlight, identify, and validate uncertainty in the
law. It is the rights thesis that leads us to intractable cases, and it
is only by recourse to the rights thesis that we may ever believe
that any particular case is immune to solution. For a court faced
with a genuinely intractable case there can, by definition, be no
hope that the rights thesis (or any conceptual model) will yield a
right answer where none exists. But even though this may be so, we
are not without standards against which to evaluate the actions of
the court, and it is the rights thesis that provides those standards.'87
Let us return to Dworkin's courtroom and his judge Hercules.
Hercules is a special judge, a superhuman one, presumably precisely
because his decisions are without controversy. Hercules is special
because he is free of the kinds of questions of fact and poor conceptual tools that misleadingly create controversies among reasonable
186. Sartorius, 11 GA. L. REV., supra note 3; see note 116 supra.
187. "In these circumstances there may be thought to be a justification for
describing the act of interpretation as one of discretion, even within the definition which
has been given. But this would be to obscure what seems to be the vital point- namely,
the effort, and the importance of the effort, of each individual deciding officer to reach
what he thinks is the right answer." H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 168 (1958), quoted in Sartorius, 8 AM.
PHILOSOPHY Q., supra note 81, at 159. See E. NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, supra note 128, at 101.
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persons even though none exist in theory.' s Where a right answer
exists, Hercules will ferret it out by application of the rights thesis
in its purest and most abstract form. But where there is no right
answer, where the kinds of uncertainty that I have been describing
crop up, Hercules will unearth these facts as well. He will not suddenly don blinders and ignore what he knows is the truth. Instead,
he will be forced to conclude that the rights thesis itself leads him
inevitably to the conclusion that he is faced with a case for which
there is no answer.
We might observe that the rights thesis must therefore fail
even Hercules in some small but important group of cases. But
failure is the wrong word, implying tacitly that some other technique would unequivocally yield a single correct outcome. In truth,
the thesis has succeeded, for it has accurately identified a case for
which no such outcome exists.
In this way it is the rights thesis that leads us to embrace
rather than reject discretion. For, even in a world in which judges
are not Herculean but only human, we should prefer their judgment
to the mechanistic application of some arbitrary rule.189 The central
lesson of intractable cases is that, faced with a case that to the best
of our judicial abilities appears to be uncertain, we do not choose to
give in to mechanistic rules.9 ' Instead, we inject our collective
humanity, in the person of our judges, into the making of impossible
decisions.' And, though Professor Dworkin's model cannot explain
the inexplicable center of the law, it can and does draw our attention to that core of uncertainty in a way that no other contemporary
theory of law does or can.

188. It may well be that Dworkin does not mean for his Hercules to be quite that
superhuman. He suggests on several occasions that different Herculean judges will reach
different outcomes. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 128-30, 280; Dworkin, supra
note 49, 153-54. Nevertheless, if the answer that Hercules seeks is indeed substantively
correct, it must be substantively certain, and if Hercules operated under the ideal circumstances he could reach only that single correct answer. To do so he might require the
skills of Richards' super-Hercules, Oberon, who is designed precisely to do Hercules' task
under ideal circumstances. Richards, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 2, at 1285-88.
189. Farago, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at § V C.
190. We learn, with Grant Gilmore, "that certainty... can be bought at too high a
price." Gilmore, Law, Logia and Experience, 3 -HOWARD L.J. 26, 37 (1957); see
Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo.Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 427, 428 (1979).
191. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT. TRAGIC CHOICES 146 (1978); Brilmayer, The
Institutionaland EmpiricalBasis of the Rights Thesis, 11 GA.L. REV. 1173, 1199 (1977).
Justice Cardozo was particularly aware of this aspect of the judicial process. B. N. CAR.
Dozo, supra note 132, at 164-67.
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